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ABSTRACT 
 
Present day analysis of the relations between Muslim and Jews almost 
automatically presumes a history of antagonism and animosity. This history is often 
addressed as primal and stretching back to the beginnings of Islam as a religion. Such 
postulations trickle into the contemporary political discourse constricting policy 
achievements for a constructive solution of the current geo-political stalemate in the 
Middle East. 
Muslims and Jews, in fact, have a history of co-existence. Anti-Semitism in 
the Middle East and hostility between Muslims and Jews increased toward the end of 
the Ottoman rule and moved further toward enmity by World War II. European anti-
Semitism of the Middle Ages and Enlightenment period could be viewed as harsher, 
more violent and brutal than its examples in the Muslim Middle East. 
Anti-Judaism as a concept in the context of Islam did not always equate to the 
racial anti-Semitism of Europe and Russia. Anti-Semitism based particularly upon 
racial or ethnic grounds and involving false suppositions and accusations came to the 
Muslim Middle East from Europe. The discrimination against the Jews in Europe 
culminated in the highest form of persecution – Hitler’s Holocaust. The Muslim 
Middle East was contaminated with the ideas of Mein Kampf in the early stages of 
formation of the independent Arab states out of the remains of the Ottoman Empire. 
After 1919, Germany, stripped of any role in the region by victorious Britain 
and France, became only a remnant of the Ottoman-German Alliance. The rise of 
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German power under the Nazis in the 1930s fostered new hopes of alliance across the 
Muslim Middle East, which could have meant a removal of the British and French 
colonial powers then present in the region. Many Muslim Arab leaders saw the new 
Germany of the 1930’s as the potential force poised to counter-balance the power 
distribution in parts of the Arab world governed by Britain and France. The new anti-
Jewish ideology, conducive in building a common ground between the occupied Arab 
states and Germany as the new contender for the world domination, was injected into 
the religious thought of the day and later woven into the interpretation of the Qur’an. 
The evolution of religion alone was not responsible for the formation of anti-
Semitic sentiment and the Jew-hatred preached today by some Islamic leaders. The 
term “Islamo-fascism”1, used in the political discourse in 2005, evoked an outburst of 
condemnation and protest. However, while it is not applicable to the Muslim world 
universally, some Muslim groups not only seek to bring about a totalitarian empire, 
but have their roots in Nazi ideology and genocide. 
Honest acknowledgment of the past propensities in the Muslim Middle East to 
embrace Nazi ideology and propaganda is a necessary step for understanding the 
phenomenon of the Islamic terrorism and racial anti-Semitism. Accurate historical 
background is essential for enacting effective policy decisions. 
Lastly, in light of the increasing number of comparisons made in the Arab 
media to equate Israel itself to Nazi Germany and some United Nations diplomats 
                                                
1 George W. Bush, "President Discusses War on Terror at National Endowment for 
Democracy ", ed. The White House (Washington, DC: Office of the Press Secretary, 
2005). 
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today publicly espousing similar views,1 there is urgency in the need to publicize an 
undistorted historical record on the subject of Islamic anti-Semitism and the Nazi 
ideological influence in the Middle East.I 
 
                                                
1 Tim Franks, "The next UN investigator into Israeli conduct in the occupied 
territories has stood by comments comparing Israeli actions in Gaza to those of the 
Nazis," BBC World Service  (2008), http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-
/2/hi/middle_east/7335875.stm. 
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Introduction 
 
Militant Islamic Jihad and the anti-Semitism of the Muslim Arab world are 
often blamed on poverty, rejection of Muslims by the modern society, lack of 
opportunity, and the colonial past of their lands. While Jihad has undergone many 
evolutions and interpretations from the times of its original conception by 
Muhammad in the seventh century, racial anti-Semitism is a much newer construct in 
Islam that gained momentum since the exposure of the Arab world to European 
culture. The modern form of Arab anti-Semitism materialized only in the 19th 
century. Prior to the Damascus affair in 1840, accusing Jews of ritual murder, for 
example, was unheard of in the Islamic world.1 The present state of Arab anti-
Semitism in the Middle East is among the most dangerous dynamics subverting its 
religious and sociological discourse, and setting it on a collision course against the 
pluralistic world societies. 
Particularly after the Second World War, many Muslim Arab countries 
became centers of support for xenophobia, barbarism, violent anti-Semitism and 
militant Jihad. Radical Islam emerged to represent a threat to the Western 
democracies incorporating within itself some of the basic features of fascism. It has 
been able to suppress and silence the voices of moderate and progressive Muslims 
who seek to revive the ways of grace and humanism in their religion. 
Publications, such as 1993 The Clash of Civilizations by Professor of Political 
                                                
1 Walter Laqueur, The Changing Face of Antisemitism (New York, NY: Oxford 
University Press, 2006), 194. 
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Science Samuel P. Huntington, have generated debates, but have not brought us 
closer to understanding the contributing sources in contemporary Muslim religious 
radicalism endorsing anti-Semitism and xenophobia. Some of the historical facts have 
been ignored and some very important questions have been omitted in the political as 
well as public discourse. Did the nature of anti-Semitism change after dealings 
between Hitler’s Germany and the leaders of the Middle Eastern communities? Why 
was the Muslim Arab world readily susceptible to the European racism? Was anti-
Zionism purposely interspersed with anti-Semitism by an unscrupulous radical 
minority interested in the escalation of both? More importantly, if we allow Islam to 
be accused as the sole culprit behind turning its followers into warmongers, we will 
do a disservice as historians, sociologists and policy makers. Islam is a word, a 
concept, and a religious framework for interpreting ethics. It can be a building block 
or a destructive weapon depending on the hands that hold it. As Bernard Lewis, quite 
thought provokingly, concludes in What Went Wrong, it is“…not “What has Islam 
done to the Muslims?” but rather “What have the Muslims done to Islam?”1 His 
answer to the question lays the blame on specific teachers, preachers, doctrines and 
groups. 
Islamism and German National Socialism shared some common ground on a 
very fundamental level. Nazi ideology nominated the Aryans as a master race or 
Herrenvolk. As such, Aryans as a people had to be not only superior to the other 
races, but also invincible. However, if that had to be the case, the blunders in the 
                                                
1 Bernard Lewis, What Went Wrong?: Western Impact and Middle Eastern Response 
(New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2002), 156. 
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military conflicts and economic crises begged a palatable explanation. The 
humiliating treaty of Versailles after the defeat in WWI, soaring inflation and 
economic stagnation were conveniently pinned on the external enemy that penetrated 
within – the Jews. At the same time, the downfall of Germany as a European power at 
the end of WWI coincided with the defeat of the Ottoman Empire. If we were to 
substitute the “master race” in this context with the chosen people, the “followers of 
the last prophet”, the instinctive affinity between the National Socialist movement 
and Global Islamism begins to emerge.1 
Nazi Germany’s policy makers sought to benefit from nationalistic aspirations 
in the Middle East. They studiously established an artificial link between German 
anti-Jewish policies and Arab anti-Zionism, though the two had little in common. 
Moreover, the enduring practices of Muslims to subject non-Muslims to a humiliating 
sub-standard social treatment provided the basic ground for absorbing Nazi 
Germany’s racist policies toward minorities in general. German anti-Semitism itself 
was not the reason, or even the first thing in common, for the parties to seek 
connections. Rather, once connected, the ideology and the key policies of the partner 
state exacerbated the compulsive anti-Zionist conceptions and social superiority left 
by earlier history. Political anti-Semitism continues to feed the trends of the violent 
Jihad and ethno-centric nationalism in the Muslim Middle East. 
 
                                                
1 Meghnad Desai, Rethinking Islamism: The Ideology of the New Terror (New York, 
NY: I.B. Tauris & Co., Ltd., 2007), 151. 
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I 
The ink of the scholar is more sacred than the blood of the martyr 
(Prophet Muhammad, 630 C.E.) 
 
Jihad is a precept of Divine institution... They [infidels] have the alternative of 
either converting to Islam or paying the poll tax (jizya), short of which war will be 
declared against them. 
(Ibn Abu Zayd al-Qayrawani (d. 996), Maliki jurist)1 
 
The conquest of the Filastin (Eretz Israel)II and Syria by the Muslim Bedouins 
around 641 C.E. connected the people of the desert to the European culture. The raids 
reaching to Syria through the Land of Israel led by the Muslim Arabs during 
Muhammad’s life did not differ from the attacks carried out by the Arab tribes out of 
Hejaz against the border settlements in the pre-Muslim periods. The new religion of 
Islam, arriving by early 600 C.E., did not incite any more specific violence or 
expulsion of a particular population than the region has seen earlier from Romans, 
Persians, Greeks, Byzantines and nomads. The Arab conquerors did not significantly 
change the administrative system already in place in the Filastin settled by Jews and 
Christians. Other than dividing the land into provinces or JundsIII ruled from their 
respective outposts predominantly for defensive and military purposes, they followed 
the prescriptions of Muhammad for co-existing with Jews and Christians or the 
“People of the Book”. Detailed descriptions of the political events and the socio-
economic environment, largely ignored by the Muslims, are documented in the 
                                                
1 Ibn Abi Zayd al-Qayrawani, "Epitre sur les elements du dogme et de la loi de l'Islam 
selon le rite malikite," in The Legacy of Jihad: Islamic Holy War and the Fate of 
Non-Muslims by Andrew G. Bostom, ed. Leon Bercher (Algiers: 1960), 27. 
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contemporary letters found in Cairo’s public record depository Genizah.1 By the 10th 
century after long decades of military campaigns, the economic life in the Arab ruled 
lands was reduced to local markets having been deprived of maritime trade with the 
other cultures around the Mediterranean. After the earthquakes of 1016 and 1033, 
trade and farming declined even more, compounded by loss of populations and the 
lack of interest among the Bedouins to settle the land. Muslim population was 
comprised of both Sunni and Shi’ia with Arabic as a common language. Jerusalem 
geographer al-Maqdisi wrote in 985 that it was difficult to find a Muslim intellectual 
in Levant in that time. Christians held most of the government positions followed by 
Jews and Samaritans. More ambitious members of Arab society moved to Syria, 
Egypt and East of Jordan where chances of success were better.2 Jewish population 
was considerable not only along the coastal plane, but in the Negev south of the Dead 
Sea, Tiberius in the North and to the East of the Jordan river. Records exist 
documenting Jewish delegations traveling to Arabia to conclude protective treaties 
with Muhammad. Judging by the description of the gifts brought by them, they had 
come from wealthy and thriving communities. In fact, first recorded disintegrations of 
the Jewish populace are tied to the Crusades in the 11th-13th centuries, when they had 
to flee the war torn region escaping alongside of Arabs, Samaritans, Zoroastrians and 
other non-Christian inhabitants of the environs.3 
                                                
1 Haiim Z'ev Hirschberg, History Until 1880, ed. The Hebrew University of 
Jerusalem Prof. Menahem Stern; Professor of Jewish History, Israel Pocket Library 
(Jerusalem, Israel: Keter Publishing House, 1973), 177. 
2 Ibid., 171-73. 
3 Ibid. 
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In general, Christian and Jewish communities have been known to thrive 
during the early Muslim rule. For a modern historian, it is quite challenging to 
determine conclusively the exact nature of Muhammad’s character and the true 
meaning of his intentions toward the non-Muslim neighbors. The contemporary 
sources criticizing his actions could very well be as biased as the ones exonerating 
him. However, the historical events documented by both sides can be scrutinized for 
possible answers as to Muhammad’s legacy as to the relations with non-Muslims. 
Ultimately, what matters more than the authentic portrait of the founder of the faith is 
the rendition of the Muslim way of life that shaped so many minds for centuries. 
Accounts of the Muslim conquest in the Arabian Peninsula, the Levant and 
Syria include merciless warfare, appropriation of the spoils of war, execution of the 
defeated foes, slave trade, as well as protection treaties. Jews, Christians and other 
non-Muslims paid heavily for the choice to keep their respective faiths. Since the 
times of Muhammad, who professed and bequeathed, “Make war on those who 
believe not in Allah and the Last Day; ... make war on them until they pay tribute and 
are humiliated”1, the Muslim rulers on the Near Eastern lands had only “Islam, tribute 
or sword” to offer to non-Muslim inhabitants.2 An equitable peace with the 
unbeliever, at least in theory, was a sin.3 
When the hostilities of war would subside the economic and social oppression 
                                                
1 William Sterns Davis, A Short History of the Near East: From the founding of 
Constanople (330 A.D. to 1922) (New York, NY: The MacMillan Company, 1923), 
122. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Ibid. 
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of Dhimmi persisted. Because of heavy land taxes imposed on the Dhimmi, Jews 
ceased to cultivate the soil and flocked to the towns flourishing with trade and crafts.1 
The Dhimmi are defined as the native infidel populations subjugated by Jihad. They 
must recognize the Muslim ownership of their land, submit to Islamic governance and 
accept the imposition of a poll tax, jizya. One of the Islamic jurists al-Mawardi 
stipulated on the nature of the Dhimmi obligation to the Islamic authority in 1058 as 
“…enemy makes a payment in return for peace and reconciliation. It does, however, 
not prevent a Jihad being carried out against them in the future.”2 Worthy of noting is 
the further detailing of the jizya procurement by the tax collectors. A thirteenth 
century Shafi’ite jurist an-Nawawi instructed: 
 
The infidel who wishes to pay jizya must be treated with disdain by 
the collector: the collector remains seated and the infidel remains standing in 
front of him, his head bowed and back bent. The infidel personally must place 
the payment on the scales, while the collector holds him by the beard, and 
strikes him on both cheeks.3 
 
The early confrontations of Muslims and Jews, albeit violent, lacked the 
underpinnings of irreconcilable elemental hate leading to perpetual war. For example, 
the battle of Ahzab fought near Medina between the Mohammad’s followers and the 
Jewish tribe Banu Qaraiza concluded with a victory for the Muslims. The last 
                                                
1 Hirschberg, History Until 1880, 172-73. 
2 al-Mawardi Abu al-Hassan, "El-Ahkam es-Soulthaniya (A Treatise on Muslim 
Public Law)," in The Legacy of Jihad: Islamic Holy War and the Fate of Non-
Muslims by Andrew G. Bostom, ed. Count Leon Ostrorog, The Laws of Islamic 
Governance (London: 1996), 29. 
3 Bat Ye'or, Islam and Dhimmitude: Where Civilizations Collide, trans. Miriam 
Kochan and David Littman (Madison, NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 
2002), 70. 
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remaining three hundred males of Banu Qaraiza were put to death after defeat, while 
women and children were taken as slaves. Terrifying and ruthless as this verdict by 
Muhammad and one of his generals Sa’ad was, it may not have been the norm 
according to the other accounts of the warfare in the first years after the onset of 
Islam in the peninsula. Thus, at least two other Jewish tribes Banu Qainuqa’ and Banu 
Nazir had been exiled after having been defeated in a military confrontation sparing 
the lives and freedom of the survivors.1 Yet in other examples, the Jews were allowed 
to retain possession of the land they held before the fighting ensued, although in most 
cases the victorious Muslims levied a special tax on those who did not choose to 
convert to Islam. In 629 C.E., the conquest of the Jewish village Khaybar ended with 
an execution of the tribe’s leaders, taking their treasures as spoils of war and, oddly 
enough, a marriage of Muhammad to the daughter of one of the Jewish tribal leaders 
Safiyya.2 
How can we account for these contradictions?  One plausible explanation is 
that in the ancient Muslim Arabia, the treatment of foes – be they Jewish, Christian or 
Bedouin – was decided on an individual basis. It varied by commanders leading the 
battle, circumstances preceding the armed conflict, sources from the religious 
scriptures cited to decide on any given judgment or ultimate objective of the battle. 
However, the same early conquests laid the foundation for the concepts of 
dhimma and jihad. The extermination and expulsion of the Medina Jews in 624-627 
                                                
1 Maulana Muhammad Ali, Muhammad The Prophet, ed. and writer of an Urdu 
Rafsir Translator of the Holy Qur'an into English (Lahore, India: Ahmadiyya 
Anjuman-I-Isha'at-I-Islam, 1924). 
2 Ibid. 
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enriched and emboldened the umma. The property of the Jewish tribes was shared 
among the conquerors, Muhammad himself receiving a fifth. Then with an inflated 
war chest and reassured by the non-aggression treaty with the Meccans, Muhammad 
massacred the Khaybar community and imposed his agreement, dhimma, upon the 
survivors of the nearby villages. The Prophet allowed them to farm their lands only as 
tenants, in exchange for a half of their harvest, and reserved the prerogative to drive 
them off the land whenever he would wish.1 The dhimma of Khaybar inspired similar 
treaties with other conquered populations outside Arabia. These episodes of the 
Prophet’s life fundamentally determined the relationships between Muslims and 
infidels that later made their way into the Qur’anic revelations.2 By the eighth 
century, Islamic juris-consults formulated the policy regarding the People of the 
Book, Jews and Christians, based on the decisions decreed by Muhammad with 
respect to the Jews of Arabia such as Khaybar community.3 Later in history, in 
seventeenth century’s India, Islamic teachers put forth that “a non-Muslim therefore 
cannot be a citizen of the State; he is member of a depressed class; his status is 
modified form of slavery. He lives under a contract with the state: for the life and 
property grudgingly spared to him by the commander of the faithful, he must undergo 
political and social disabilities, and pay a commutation money.”4 Moreover, the 
establishment of the dhimma indirectly assigned a certain status to the position of a 
                                                
1 Ye'or, Islam and Dhimmitude, 37. 
2 Ibid., 38. 
3 Ibid., 41. 
4 Jadunath Sarkar, "The Islamic State Church in India," in History of Aurangzib: 
Northern India, 1658-1681, ed. K. S. Lal (London: Longmans Green & Co., 1920), 
283-97. 
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harbi, or an individual beyond the rule of Islam. A harbi resided in dar al-Harb, or 
outside of the land of Islam, dar al-Islam, and was not a party to any contracts with 
the Prophet. Harbi was automatically a subject to one choice and one choice only – 
conversion or submission.1 The pursuit of jihad until this objective is achieved – be it 
morally (bi-al-nafs), militarily or financially (bi-al-mal) – has been deemed a sacred 
obligation of every Muslim.2 Hostility and contempt for the infidels were essential 
elements for waging the war of Jihad. This (state of mind) was elemental in its appeal 
to envy, hate, and, ultimately, violence, and was integral part of paving the way for 
Jihad.3 Henceforth, the first works of propaganda to incite the sentiments of 
intolerance were expressed in poems, teachings, and literature of the Islamic world.4 
These approaches to the treatment of conquered subjects may have been the 
first manifestations of the national divisions based on race and the onset of 
intolerance for minorities in Islamic societies. They also may be fully considered the 
grounds for hatred, as it must be necessary for Jihad. 
 
                                                
1 Ye'or, Islam and Dhimmitude, 41. 
2 Gilles Kepel, Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam, trans. Anthony F. Roberts, First 
English ed. (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2002), 
146. 
3 Bernard Lewis, Islam in History: Ideas, People, and Events in the Middle East, 
Second ed. (Chicago, IL: Open Court Publishing, 1993), 173. 
4 Ibid., 172. 
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The most vehement of mankind in hostility be the Jews…the greediest of mankind 
desire nothing, but your ruin…Alah hath cursed them for their disbelief. Taste ye the 
punishment of burning. 
(The Hadith of the Holy Qu’ran)1 
 
Throughout history, some individuals have been known to affect the social 
cognition of large numbers of people, compelling them to embrace their particular 
interpretation of the ideal future and the necessary means to achieve it. We may only 
wonder what Islam would be like today, if there had been no Ibn Taymiyya, al-
Wahhab or Saiyyd Qutb. A few theoreticians indeed played an important role in 
shaping the subsequent schools of Islamic thought, as it pertains to the relations 
between Muslims, Jews and other non-Muslims. 
Through the ages, Islamic ideologues called upon the Islamic community 
(umma) to purify and purge itself of jahiliyya, or the corrupting abhorrence, and to 
follow the teachings of Muhammad literally, while they wove in a few teachings of 
their own. Some of their teachings and actions are a part of a foundation, upon which 
contemporary Islamist movements have built further.2 
Ibn Taymiyya (1268-1328) is referred to by many as the spiritual father of 
Sunni Islam. Precariously, contemporary IslamistsIV draw on his teachings to 
authorize genocidal murder. Ibn Taymiyya lived during one of many disorderly 
periods of Muslim Asia. In 1258 the Mongol Hordes captured Baghdad and 
conquered the Abbasid Empire. Taymiyya’s family was forced to flee to Damascus 
                                                
1 Joan Peters, From Time Immemorial: The Origins of the Arab-Jewish Conflict Over 
Palestine (Chicago, IL: J. KAP Publishing, 2000; reprint, 2000). 
2 John L. Esposito, Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam, Paperback ed. (New 
York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2002), 45. 
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and was subjected to a difficult life as refugees in a strange land. The painful 
experience of homeless wander may have shaped his decisive and radical stances on 
the interpretation of Hanbali Islamic law. As a religious scholar and political activist, 
he called for rigorous and exact following of the sacred sources – Qu’ran and 
Sunnah.1 He insisted that a replication of the earliest Islamic community was crucial 
to restoring Allah’s grace toward Muslims. The Medina community during the times 
of Muhammad represented to him a prime example of such social order. He believed 
that the return of the pristine and uncompromised religious purity of that period was 
necessary to rebuild the power and greatness of Islam for its believers. Ibn 
Taymiyya’s fury was particularly directed at the Mongols, who ruled the Asian lands 
East of Egypt at that time. However, therein was a dilemma – Mongols were 
Muslims. The separation between Islamic and non-Islamic had to be further defined 
to justify jihad against them. The Mongols were converts to Islam who continued to 
follow some of their pre-Islamic traditions of the Khans. Ibn Taymiyya made use of 
these flaws to render them as unbelievers or kafirim.2 Furthermore, he declared them 
to be excommunicated from faith and issued a fatwa, a sanction for persecution, 
calling for jihad against them. It became one of the precedents in recorded history of 
Islam, of a religious scholar justified killings on the grounds of non-Islamic roots and 
practices alone. The other Muslim citizens were reminded of their right, and even a 
duty of true subjects of Islam, to revolt against the kafirim in order to extinguish the 
apostasy from their midst. 
                                                
1 Esposito, Unholy War. 
2 Ibid. 
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Later generations of Islamic theoreticians built extensively on the Ibn 
Taymiyya’s concepts of dar al-Islam and dar al-Harb, or the land of Islam and the 
land of war. His school became an epitome of the logic used to distinguish between 
Allah-pleasing Islam and jahiliyya, or deviant immorality. Ibn Taymiyya’s viewpoint 
accented another peculiar angle. If it was as righteous as it was venerable to persecute 
and kill even self-proclaimed Muslims as apostates, what chance was left to the Jews, 
Christians and other non-Muslim dhimmi in dar al-Islam? To invoke a few names, 
Ibn Al-Qayyin Al-Jawziyya (d.1350), a disciple of Ibn Taymiyya and an author of 
Qur’an exegesis and Hadith commentary, Muhammad ibn Ahmad al-Qurtubi (d. 
1273), a Hadith scholar and famous Koran exegete, Yahya Ibn Sharaf Al-Nawawi 
(d.1277) well-known Hadith scholar and author of a famous Hadith collection and 
Muhammad ibn Ali Al-Shawkani (d. 1839), a Yemenite religious scholar whose 
writings influenced modern Islamist thought, are in unison in their renditions of Islam 
based on Ibn Taymiyya’s teachings. They maintain that “anyone who peruses his 
sources reaches a single conclusion: The ulama, or Islamic religious authorities, have 
agreed that the reciprocal punishment to which the verses referred to is not limited to 
a given specific instance. It is a valid rule for the punishment of the infidels, sinful 
Muslims, and all other unjust”.1 
Muhammad ibn Adb al-Wahhab (1703-1791) is another scholar of Islamic law 
who took Ibn Taymiyya’s philosophy fervently. Once again, a self-proclaimed 
                                                
1 MEMRI, "Contemporary Islamist Ideology Authorizing Genocidal Murder," in 
ANTISEMITISM DOCUMENTATION PROJECT (Middle East Media Research 
Institute, 2004). 
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Islamic theologian called upon the Muslim community to reject some popular beliefs 
and practices of the preceding four centuries as idolatry and jahiliyya. He called upon 
the faithful to discard any innovations in the oral law that may have been adopted 
since the Muhammad’s times by the religious authorities (ulama), as bida or heresy; 
and, analogously to his predecessor five hundred years prior, called for jihad against 
them.1 Centuries later the world has observed the implications attributed to his 
iconoclasm and religious fanaticism, when the Wahhabi-inspired Taliban destroyed 
ancient Buddhist monuments in Afghanistan. The jihad they carried out was directed 
at the deviant and the profane in their view. 
Many present day Islamic radicals try to support the state sponsored anti-
Semitic propaganda by attributing the supposed prescriptions for the hatred of the 
Jews to the patriarchs of faith such as al-Wahhab and ibn-Taymiyya.2 
                                                
1 Esposito, Unholy War, 47. 
2 Ibid. 
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Yes, the existence of a separate Palestinian identity serves only tactical purpose. The 
founding of a Palestinian state is a new tool in a continuing battle against Israel. 
(Zuheir Muhsin, late Military Department Head of the PLO and a member of its 
Executive Council. (Dutch daily “Trouw”, March 1977))1 
 
The rhetorical balance between the traditional anti-Judaic prejudices and the 
fundamental anti-Semitism evolved further before the end of the nineteenth century. 
Muslim ideologues such as Hassan al-Banna (1906-1949) and Sayyid Qutb (1906-
1966) became the prime models of the neo-fundamentalism for new activist 
organizations across the Muslim Arab world. They did not take long to connect 
Zionism, Western Imperialism, Colonialism, Communism and anti-Semitism as the 
factors of the same matrix. 
Al-Banna drew a direct connection between the failed liberal nationalism in 
Egypt and continuing British occupation, unemployment, poverty, corruption and the 
creation of the state of Israel.2 In his view, the Jews were no longer merely benefiting 
from the weakness of the Muslims, as in the times of al-Wahhab, but actively crafting 
it. The much-despised colonialism now acquired a new extended name – Jewish 
Zionism. A spiritual or non-violent jihad would no longer suffice. The Muslim lands 
were being invaded, he said; and every good Muslim is to repel the invaders just as 
one is to eradicate the Muslim rulers who block the establishment of Islamic 
governments.3 Hassan al-Banna became the founder of the Society of the Muslim 
Brothers, which grew to be an international Sunni Islamist movement and the world’s 
                                                
1 As found in Peters, From Time Immemorial: The Origins of the Arab-Jewish 
Conflict Over Palestine, 137. 
2 Esposito, Unholy War, 51. 
3 Ibid. 
  16 
largest and the most influential political Islamist group. 
Saiyyd Qutb further expanded upon the concepts of Hassan al-Banna. If al-
Banna was viewed as the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, Saiyyd Qutb was 
regarded as the Godfather and Martyr of Islamic Radicalism.1 As al-Banna, Qutb was 
educated in the contemporary educational institutions with modern curriculum. 
However, the knowledge of Western thought did not preclude his formation of 
extremist opinions in the late 1940s. The rhetoric in his writings directly and 
aggressively condemned the West and the United States in particular. Hassan al-
Banna, having already rejected the preference of a spiritual jihad over military one, 
called to repel the invaders in a broad, perhaps even ambiguous, spectrum of 
enemies.2 Qutb identified specific and attainable targets. In his manuscript Milestones 
he pointedly called America anti-Arab and pro-Jewish blaming it for injecting the 
capitalism into the Middle East by the proxy of Israel.3 An official in the Ministry of 
Public Instruction, a literary critic and a poet, Qutb grew to be an incredibly prolific 
author publishing over forty volumes translated into English and Farsi. His fiery style 
was said to stimulate profound anger and revulsion. As an interesting coincidence, his 
manuscript of Milestones was written during his imprisonment in Egypt and later 
became nothing short of his own personal Mein Kampf. A devout Muslim who 
memorized Qur’an in his childhood,4 Saiyyd Qutb also attempted to establish himself 
as a religious authority. He wrote of Islam’s own social teachings and justice. 
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Describing his followers as a small special group of true Muslims and a righteous 
minority – “I have written Milestones for this vanguard, which I consider to be 
waiting reality about to be materialized”1 – he moved to implore all Muslims to join 
the armed struggle of jihad. Ultimately, he counted those Muslims who declined to 
participate among the enemies of God and blasphemous apostates, takfirim.2 
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II 
Deutschland Über Allah! 
(Peter Hopkirk) 
 
 
In the letter dated October 24 of 1915, Sir Henry McMahon wrote to the 
Sherif Hussein of Mecca about Great Britain’s intentions with respect to the future 
Arab Muslim world then still enveloped within the borders of the Ottoman Empire. 
He issued assurance to recognize and support the independence of the Arabs in all 
regions demanded by the Sherif. Among the assurances were the guarantee of 
protection of the Holy Places against all external aggression and the promise to 
provide the Arabs with a counsel and assistance in establishing the most suitable form 
of government in the outlined territories. The language contained explicit assertions 
such as:  
I am convinced that this declaration will assure you beyond all 
possible doubt of the sympathy of Great Britain towards the aspirations of her 
friends the Arabs and will result in a firm and lasting alliance, the immediate 
results of which will be the expulsion of the Turks from the Arab countries 
and the freeing of the Arab peoples from the Turkish yoke, which for so many 
years has pressed heavily upon them. (From the correspondence between Sir 
Henry McMahon and the Sherif Hussein of Mecca, July 1915 – March 1916, 
London, England)1 
 
Indeed with Turkey’s entry into the war the Middle East became an area of 
high concern for Great Britain. Not all the Arabs were united in the idea of shaking 
off the Turkish yoke, and many chose to fight on the side of Turkey defending the 
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Caliphate and Dar Al-Islam (the domain of Islam). As a whole province, Yemen, for 
example, remained loyal to the Empire till its last day.1 The political maneuvers of 
Britain also became more complicated by the Zionist movement, which, coincidently, 
started gaining a real momentum at the same time. The promises made to the Arabs 
had to be altered by the new promises of independence and self-governance made to 
the Jews. The Memorandum by Arthur Balfour referring to Syria, Palestine and 
Mesopotamia dated August 11th of 1919 stated: 
…Zionism be it right or wrong, good or bad, is rooted in age-long 
traditions, in present needs, in future hopes, of far profounder import than the 
desires and prejudices of the 700,000 Arabs who now inhabit that ancient 
land. (DBFP 1919-1939, First Series, vol. IV, no. 242)2 
 
The Balfour declaration in favor of a Jewish national home in Palestine came 
out of wartime calculation and a positive commitment of many British officials in 
support of Zionism. In its essence the declaration was a promise to the world Jewry of 
a national home of refuge. The concessions to Jewish Diaspora were partly made in 
hopes to create an appeal for the American and Russian Jews at the time when the 
war outlook for the alliance looked dim.3 However, with Adolf Hitler’s ascent to 
power in Germany in 1933, the landscape became much more complex. 
From 1933 to 1939, the Jewish population in British Palestine increased 
dramatically as refugees fled the persecution in Europe and reached a third of the total 
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population West of Jordan River.1 The rapid change in demographics became one of 
the contributing reasons for the civil unrest among the local Muslim Arabs, which 
resulted in uprisings and violence. By 1938, Britain altered its official position on 
creation of Jewish National Home in British-mandated Palestine, and, shortly after, 
halted the Jewish immigration into the region altogether. 
Having emerged as a strong player on the European stage, Nazi Germany 
insisted on the need for hegemony over Europe and an alternative to the imperialism 
in the North Africa and Middle East. Many Arab nationalists looked to Germany for 
inspiration and saw National Socialism as a working model for state and nation 
building. Coupled with the history of German involvement with the Ottoman Empire, 
the rise of the powerful ally may have been pleasantly reminiscent of the past. 
German Kaiser Wilhelm II standing next to the Ottoman Emperor Abdul-
Hamid inside the great Mosque in Istanbul solemnly declared himself a “protector of 
all Muslims” on October 18th of 1898.2 During the same visit, the Kaiser proposed to 
build the Baghdad-Berlin railroad connecting Germany to the Persian Gulf and 
Persia. Even though Abdul-Hamid was suspicious over the German motives, 
Wilhelm’s promises and rhetoric were reinforced by certain actions such as the sale 
of German-made rifles and other small arms to the Ottoman army.3 Consequently, 
Turkish soldiers were among the first troops in the twentieth century warfare to be 
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equipped with new automatic fire weapons, such as the German Maschinengewehr. 
The German army itself deployed over 12,000 of these machine guns to the Western 
front. Similar actions and overtures by Germany helped to mask Germany’s political 
and economic exploitation of the Ottoman Empire and provided sufficient incentives 
for the Ottomans to view Germany as a very motivated ally if not a close friend.1 
Hence, the railway construction project was seen as both the proof and a product of 
the Turko-German friendship. 
To commemorate the second anniversary of the German Emperor’s visit to 
Turkey an architectural structure known as The German Fountain (in Turkish Alman 
Ã‡eÅŸmesi) was erected in 1900 across from the mausoleum of Sultan Ahmed I. It 
was made in Germany and then transported in pieces to be assembled on site in 
Istanbul. 
The blunt fact that a Christian sovereign encouraged and funded Muslims to 
remain on a warpath against those of his own faith did not seem to trouble anyone in 
the Middle East. Rumors of Kaiser Wilhelm secretly converting to Islam and 
incognito making a pilgrimage to Mecca were circulating in the mosques and bazaars. 
Some Islamic scholars even found mysterious passages in the Qur’an, which revealed 
that Wilhelm had been ordained by God to free the faithful from the infidel rule.2 
The history of cooperation between the Ottoman Empire and Kaiser Germany 
firmed up the ground for Germany’s bi-lateral relations with the Middle East. 
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Germany’s subtle approach to extending its imperial influence, as compared to the 
approaches of the other European powers, was favored by the Turks. In truth, this 
collaboration, probably, was nothing more than a marriage of convenience based on 
self-interests. 
Germany’s example of economic recovery in 1930s and political self-
determination, indeed, became alluring to the underdeveloped Arab nations, who 
were, like Germany, also unhappy with the stipulations of the 1919 Treaty of 
Versailles. Under Hitler, Germany came out of the financial and industrial crisis 
having adopted policies that ignored free market liberalism. Nazi Germany re-
armament, which was done in defiance of the 1919 Paris Peace Conference, further 
assisted the economic boost. In short fifteen years, Germany came to represent the 
success of bold and rebellious political play and self-ensured sovereignty. Hitler 
himself was admired by many in the Muslim Middle East for his dynamic rise to 
power, skill of leadership, ability to balance religious and political authorities, and, 
especially, for the enthusiasm and determination to repair the inequities of the post-
war settlement.1 The Hitler’s regime’s anti-Jewish policies also generated 
considerable popularity.2 Most Arabs did not recognize the fact that it was Germany 
they revered and its anti-Semitism that were directly responsible for the dramatic 
increase in Jewish immigration in Palestine. 
Concurrently, anti-Semitism played a permanent role in German politics by 
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the nineteenth century. The leaders of Germany including the legendary Chancellor 
Otto von Bismarck could not avoid addressing the “Jewish problem” in front of their 
constituencies. Adolf Stocker, the founder of the Christian Social Workers’ Party, 
said in 1879: “Germans must protect themselves from Jews through wise legislation”. 
When the “Anti-Semites’ Petition” demanding to free Germany from Jews was 
presented to Otto von Bismarck in the April of 1881, it already had over two hundred 
and twenty-five thousand signatures.1 The Jews were named as one of the principal 
adversaries of the new order. By contrast, the old world was viewed as desperately 
corrupt and something which must be destroyed in order to clear the way for the new 
reality. The concept of this antagonism between the impeding parasite and the 
nemesis is important in the philosophy of both German Nazism and Militant Islam for 
understanding the parallels between the policies of both extremist regimes. 
By 1930s, anti-Semitism in Germany expanded to a full-scale selective 
persecution no longer based on only religion or any particular political views. Anti-
Semitism reached its worst manifestation in a form of a racial Jew-hatred. This point 
of time, when a change in religion could no longer protect a Jew from anti-Semitism, 
marked the lowest step2 on the downward descent toward hatred endorsed by the 
government. When ethno-centric nationalism erupted with enmity toward cultural 
communities of Gypsies or Jews in Europe, political anti-Semitism rendered itself 
useful in drawing artificial divisions between the presumably entitled and cunningly 
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parasitic populations. A similar paradigm always existed within the Islamic society, 
and political anti-Semitism would take it one step farther – the dhimmi would no 
longer be assured survival even through a conversion to Islam. 
  25 
In the imperialistic division of the world, Germany did not end up as rich with 
controlled territories as did her rivals. Unlike Britain, France, Germany had no 
colonies in the Middle East and North Africa. Her colonies in Africa, East Asia and 
Pacific were distant and separated by the territories not controlled by Germany’s 
allies. In fact, German colonies not only did not bolster German imperialistic 
standings, but were perhaps more taxing on the state than they were profitable. As 
such, they did not significantly improve Germany’s access to seaports, raw materials 
and markets. The African land holdings in the territories of Namibia, Botswana, 
Rwanda, Burundi, Cameroon, Togoland, and a few colonized Pacific islands along 
with Chinese Kiautschou province, required more resources for their development 
and security than they were able to return. Ironically, New Swabia (Neu-
Schwabenland), the newly claimed German colony in Antarctica, was more 
defensible and presented a higher strategic value for the war than other colonies held 
by the Third Reich. New Swabia was never recognized as a German property or a 
protectorate by the world powers; but, even if it had been, it would not have pacified 
Germany enough to sit on the sidelines during the Great Game for the Middle East. 
Historians reflected on the aspirations of Germany, France, United States, Great 
Britain, and Russia1 to attract and retain partners in the Middle East and Central 
Asia.2 Aleksey Nikolayevich Kuropatkin, the Russian Imperial Minister of War 1898-
1904, said in 1900, for example: 
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When we gain control over the Bosporus and the entrance to the 
Mediterranean, we shall be able to tackle the Egyptian question with energy 
and make the Suez Canal our thoroughfare. When we have won this entry into 
the Indian Ocean, we can constantly threaten India. Russian competition on 
the world market will intimidate the highly developed countries of Europe and 
America . . . and we shall extend our tentacles towards the Atlantic.1 
 
These policies of expansionism often exploited financial incentives and 
nationalistic appeals. In cases of some Muslim Arab provinces courted by Germany, 
anti-Semitism rendered itself a useful tool of propaganda for alienation of the local 
populace from their masters. In its consequences this multi-level game for influence 
led to the prevailing ethno-centric nationalism, suffering minorities, deteriorating 
social fabric and the isolation of the affected societies. 
The spike in nationalism on the brink of WWI in Europe coincided with the 
intensified national aspirations in the Middle East. Benjamin Lieberman masterfully 
described how nineteenth century nationalism created antagonisms between people 
previously co-existing in the Russian, Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires. The 
accentuated differences between the majority and the minorities became incorporated 
into a notion of a threat.2 Quite accurately, other historians as well have called the 
sharp rise in nationalism and the subsequent war “the Suicide of the Empires”.3 Self-
determination based on ethnicity played a major role in creating a sustaining 
propensity toward racism. Conversely, American President Woodrow Wilson 
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denounced and excluded ethnic differentiation from his vision of one people under 
the flag of the United States. If we could learn a lesson from this historical example, it 
would be one of ethno-centric nationalism vs. pluralist nation building. National pride 
is not a destructive force when it is used to foster unity not segregation. On the 
contrary, it can be one of the first building blocks of a strong, diverse and pluralistic 
civil society. 
Individuals and whole societies coped with and reconciled their stances on 
Nazi Germany in their own way. In retrospect, let us not forget that the whole truth 
about genocide and the full extent of the war atrocities committed by the Nazis did 
not become broad public knowledge until after 1943. The Nuremburg trial had not yet 
taken place to equate the Nazi swastika with its abhorrent reality; therefore, 
individual conjectures of one’s position on Nazism might have been mostly 
inferential. Individuals, societies and their leaders adopted various levels of an 
acceptance, or necessary tolerance, of Hitler’s Germany. Myopic and shallow 
worldviews coupled with indifference and low moral standards were troubling if not 
dangerous lenses to view Nazi fascists and their policies. Immature social awareness 
with an impaired sense of equality, pluralism and humanism made for an environment 
ripe for the Nazi ascent. 
Such may have been the dispositions of some individuals in the Muslim Arab 
Middle East as well. However, for some Muslim Arab leaders considered in this text, 
the truth about the true intentions of Hitler and his ilk was known all along even 
before 1943. Not only did it not contradict their radical religious and political 
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conventions, but rather complemented them. These leaders chose the alliance with 
Hitler even beyond the exposure of the Nazi crimes to the world community, 
ultimately dragging their followers deeper into the pit of hate and prejudice. 
Generations of their constituencies still live in a world where the Holocaust is denied, 
and Hitler’s henchmen are mere defeated combatants falsely accused and excessively 
punished by the unchallenged justice of the victors. 
An international conference denying the occurrence of Holocaust organized 
by the Iranian Foreign Ministry’s Institute for Political and International Studies 
could serve as an insight into that world. Sixty-seven foreign researchers from thirty 
countries attended this conference. Fitting the tone of the conference, one of the 
presenters to the assembly was David Duke, an American white-supremacist, white 
nationalist, neo-Nazi, former Grand Wizard of the Ku Klux Klan, and a former 
Louisiana State representative.1 The United States condemned the conference 
emphasizing that the Iranian regime “perversely seeks to call the historical fact… into 
question and provide a platform for hatred.”2 
Thus, the Nazis saw the Arab resentment of the French and British colonial 
powers as a backdoor to the Middle Eastern theater. The Middle East had a high 
strategic value and could potentially decide the outcome of the war on the Western 
fronts. Sir Winston Churchill observed in retrospect, “If General Wavell… had 
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broken under the intense strain to which he was subjected by events and by our 
orders, the whole future of the war and of Turkey might have been fatefully altered.”1 
Conversely, Nazi Germany appeared as a world power that was promising the 
Arabs liberation from the infidels, who were ruling them, asking little in return. All 
that was required was to join in the struggle against the very infidels whom they both 
wanted to expel from the Middle East. Hitler ardently repudiated the colonial policy 
of Great Britain and France not only in private meetings with Hajj Amin al-Husseini, 
the Mufti of Jerusalem, but openly in the international forum. During the visit of 
Swedish official Sven Hedin in October 1939, the Fuhrer decisively rejected any 
criticism of annexation of lands in Europe and pompously exclaimed, “What is meant 
by “redress of the wrong done to Bohemia and Moravia?” I might by this token 
demand that England redress the wrong done to India, Egypt, and Palestine!”2 
Under the nationalistic ambitions for independence from the colonial powers, 
an alliance with Hitler’s Germany may have been perceived as a remedy with 
minimal if any side effects. German diplomacy of a selfless benefactor left a 
favorable long-lasting impression, and later generations of the Muslim Arab leaders 
spoke of Germany in glowing terms. In June of 1955, during the visit of Herr Eugen 
Gerstenmaier, the President of the Bundestag and the head of the German-Africa 
Society, President of Egypt Gamal Abdel Nasser regarded Germany as the “Savior of 
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Egypt and Islam” and “…liberator of the Nile Valley from the imperialistic designs of 
Britain and her American and French allies, and the one symbol of international 
virtue, which has never subjected Egypt to domination or colonial exploitation.” He 
asserted then, "I especially love Germany, because this country has never 
demonstrated imperialistic dispositions toward the Arab world…”1 
In the postwar times, the pro-Nazi past of the Muslim Arab world became "... 
a source of pride, not shame."2 The Muslim Arabs saw the failure of the Allies to 
prosecute the Grand Mufti and other Nazi collaborators as "not only a weakness of 
the Europeans, but also an absolution for the past and future occurrences," Simon 
Wiesenthal commented in 1947. 
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Perfection we may hope to find in individuals. Among the nations of the world, 
perfection is unknown. 
(William Haas, New York, September 1945) 
 
The case of Iran serves as a good example of the deep reach by the Third 
Reich in absence of any significant direct links with Hitler’s Germany. A never 
colonized autonomous state, Persia still did not escape the storm of the powerful 
belligerents; and, before the end of WWI, Persia was invaded from the North and 
South by the Russian and British armies respectively. 
Since the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 Great Britain enjoyed a secure 
access to the Persian Gulf for the transport of Persian oil for its navy,1 which became 
dependent on this new fuel by the onset of WWI.2 A few years later, the 
Constantinople Agreement of 1915 essentially sanctioned Great Britain’s control in 
Persia, now including the neutral zone rich with oil reserves. Simultaneously, Russia 
was afforded the control over the Constantinople and the straits uncontested by 
Britain and France.3 London requested that the southern half of Persia be recognized 
as a British sphere, while Paris asked for an outright annexation of Syria.4 Such hasty 
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mutual appeasement or “simply compulsive gestures of self-preservation”, as later 
characterized by Sir Winston Churchill,1 may have been not indirectly prompted by 
the recently installed German mission in Turkey in 1913.2 Perhaps to perpetuate the 
notion of good will among the Muslims or to establish some barriers for a potential 
Russian expansion further, London requested that the holy Muslim places and Arabia 
shall “under all circumstances remain under independent Mussulman dominion.”3 
However, the Constantinople Agreement was never fulfilled, as the collapsed 
Tsarist Russia exited from the war before the terms went into effect. The status quo 
was disturbed again by the upsurge of the revolutionary activities along the southern 
borders of the former Russian Empire. 
Former components of the Ottoman Empire, Egypt, Transjordan, and Iraq, 
were formed by Britain into a block of controlled clients, partially to ensure secure 
routes to Persia, India, and East Asia. Meanwhile, Persian territory was suspended in 
a power vacuum left by the collapsing Tsarist Russia. The 1919 Anglo-Persian Treaty 
was drawn in an attempt to stabilize the now weak link in the chain. According to the 
accord, British military would assist the Persian army through its modernization. It 
also included provisions of the arms sales and financing loans.4 However, the political 
accord, while seemingly mutually prudent by Western standards, was not received 
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well in Persian circles. The public outcry in Persia against what most Persians saw as 
the patronizing British Imperialism was followed by the formal protests from France, 
the Soviet Revolutionary Government, and the United States; who feared impending 
difficulties in open trading and other dealings with Persia. Soviet Foreign Commissar 
Chicherin used such strong terms as “English beast of prey”, “shameful Anglo-
Persian treaty”, “a noose of final enslavement” and “sold you to the English predator” 
in expressing the Soviet position.1 The Persian sentiment against the foreign imperial 
domination elevated to the highest yet from its historical levels. In this political 
environment, Colonel Riza Khan carried out a bloodless coup d’etat in February of 
1921. London denied any involvement. Later publication of the diaries of a British 
military officer Sir Edmund Ironside suggested connections to at least some of her 
Majesty’s government’s officials,2 although historians viewed the account as 
controversial.V Considering the international reaction to the Anglo-Persian accord and 
particularly the vivid diplomatic language used by Persia’s reckless and volatile 
neighbor to the North to describe the feeble treaty, the change in the ruling body had 
to be received by the British as a relief, even if only temporary. The depth of foreign 
involvement in governmental performance is still debated by the historians; 
nonetheless, it is safe to say that the new government of Persia was compelled to be 
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cooperative with the West. However, Reza Shah’s idea of Persian independence did 
not match the British views on the same. Realizing that it would be impossible to 
monopolize Persia, London decided on building up Persia as an independent power 
under a capable ruler.1 Hence, Reza Khan found himself more able to choose 
international partners by the mid 1920s. The American interests in Persia were 
limited to missionary activities before the war, although they grew by mid-1930s with 
the growing importance of oil.2 The French observed mostly cultural interests; and 
the Soviets openly renewed their strategies to spread the “Revolution in the East”, 
having perceived Great Britain becoming less of an obstacle to their ambitions in 
Asia.3 Meanwhile, Germany was also ready to step up as a solid economic and 
political ally by the end of 1930s. 
During the time of the Third Reich, Germany was one of the world’s most 
advanced nations in technology, science, medicine, and military arts. More 
importantly, it had capital and products to export. The centralized economy of 
Germany was poised to offer Iran trade facilities, which the other Western 
democracies could not afford to grant. Teheran employed more and more German 
experts and engineers; and Germany quickly moved to first place in the 
industrialization of Iran.4 By 1941, foreign trade with Germany was valued at 
813,714,000 rialsVI ($25,037,980), as contrasted with Russian 200,803,000 rials 
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($6,178,708), and American 196,641,000 rials ($6,050,644).1 The Imperial Company, 
The Central Company and The Cotton Goods Company led the way in 
industrialization. Founded in 1931, The Imperial Company, for example, represented 
holdings of 5,000 shares of stock, 1,000 shares of which belonged to German firms.2 
The propaganda apparatus closely followed economic expansion; and every 
German specialist sent to Iran could be surely counted on being a ready Nazi 
propagandist.3 Such state visits as that of the head of Nazi Youth Movement Baldur 
von Schirach alongside of the Reichsbank President Dr. Schacht became a common 
occurrence.4 In a very short time, German methods and institutions were mimicked as 
benchmarks. Among the new initiatives were the militarization of education and the 
Office for the Direction of Public Opinion.5 Before the end of his reign, the Shah 
established the Department of Press and Propaganda. It was modeled in a European 
fashion and pursued institutionalization of nationalistic spirit based on historical 
content.6 
Despite the grave concerns of Britain and Soviet Union over Iran’s pacifist 
stances toward Hitler’s Germany, the Shah refused to join the allies, deport the 
German nationals living in Iran and refused to permit the Trans-Iranian Railway to be 
used for transporting of desperately needed war supplies into Russia. By the end of 
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August 1941, an American diplomat in Iran relying on his intelligence reported that 
there were around twenty five hundred Germans living in Iran. Around seven hundred 
of them were not only in the direct employ of the Iranian government, but were 
strategically placed in the radio station, railway, commercial organizations, and other 
public services.1 Contrary to these estimates, Iran’s minister of foreign affairs Javad 
Ameri assured the Allies that the number of Germans “was not so great as 
pretended.”2 Could this and other subtle acts of defiance against the Allies at war with 
Germany have been a political move emboldened by the Hitler’s tanks surging toward 
the Caucuses? Perhaps an answer may further be revealed in the remarks of Iranian 
ambassador to his American counterpart in Moscow on August 23, 1941. After 
referring to the Soviet and British notes as “impertinent”, he stated in part that 
“…Iran would defend itself as best as it could against any attempted violation of its 
sovereignty by either the Soviet Union or Britain or both.”3 
Sir Winston Churchill personally expressed a deep concern over the German 
presence in Iran. He urged the War Office and the Chiefs of Staff to “…give Persians 
an ultimatum from Britain and Russia to clear out the Germans without delay or take 
the consequences.”4 Given the extreme strategic importance of Iran’s position with 
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respects to the oil fields, the Persian Gulf and the land shipping routes, nothing could 
be left to chance. In August of 1941, Winston Churchill wrote to the British Minister 
of Information “Do try to blend in without causing trouble the word Persia instead of 
Iran.” In the same month, he also wrote with similar propositions to the Foreign 
Secretary Sir Edward Bridges and General Ismay suggesting that “in all 
correspondence it would be more convenient to use the word ”Persia” instead of 
“Iran”; while diplomatically agreeing that “formal correspondence with the Persian 
government should of course be conducted in the form they like.”1 Churchill’s 
anxiety over a possible destabilization of Persia in favor of Nazi Germany was 
conveyed repeatedly in 1941 and 1942. He insisted on a formation of a special 
committee to ensure the success of the Persian operation. He stressed the necessity to 
allocate strong enough available military forces “to occupy Ahwaz oilfields in the 
face of local and official Persian opposition.”2 
Was this level of anxiety about Persian-German alignment unfounded or 
irrational? To the contrary, the Nazi propaganda machine was not to be 
underestimated. Soon after NSDAP’s ascent to power in 1933, the number of journals 
in Farsi such as Iranshahr, Mehr-e Iran (the Love of Iran), Partow-e Iran (the Light of 
Iran), Anahita and Takht-e Jamshid (the seat of Jamshid – legendary ancient Persian 
king) rapidly increased and came to dominate the Persian literary scene in Berlin. 
Major von Viban of the Political Department of the NSDAP directly edited at least 
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one of the periodicals titled Iran-e Bastan (the Ancient Iran).1 Its pages were filled 
with appeals to awakening of Persian nationalism and exaltations for the past virtues 
and glories of the nation.2 The journal perpetually looked for common grounds 
between the Pahlavi regime in Persia and the fascism in Nazi Germany. It explored 
every horizon including compelling Iranian women to embrace the European progress 
and German achievements in particular. Images of the prominent women in the Third 
Reich emphasized their ability to affect the society on the same footing with their 
husbands. Mrs. Goebbles herself was once featured helping her husband, the Nazi 
Propaganda Minister, in recording a radio appearance.3 Uniformed girls forming 
Hitler Youth Groups were shown alongside the popular writer Gabriella de Reuter. 
German women parachutists, athletes and motorcyclists painted a picture of a brave 
new Jahan-e Zanan (Women’s World) in the women’s sections of Iran-e Bastan, 
Iranshahr, Iran-e Emruz, and other popular magazines published in Germany.4 
In their scholarly and editorial writings, the Nazis highlighted the spiritual 
affinity between the Aryans of the North and the nation of Zoroaster traceable to the 
ancient past.5 Some similarities in pagan religious practices and language conceptions 
may exist, but cannot go beyond general observations. However, factual evidence of 
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ancient Aryans appearing in Mesopotamia in the seventh century B.C.E. and forming 
an empire called Mitanni has been found in cuneiform records.1 
The Nazis saw Persia as a country with profoundly non-Islamic traditions and 
distinct from the Arab culture in the Middle East.2 Regardless of whether or not the 
leaders of the Nazi movement genuinely believed that the emblem of the swastika 
was derived from the mythology of the Caucasus area of Persia, the Nazis studiously 
fed the hopes of a Greater Iran among the Persian nationalists and exploited all 
available angles to subvert the influence of the Allies. The Reich Cabinet even issued 
as formal decree in early 1936 that exempted Iranians from the restrictions of the 
Nuremburg Racial Laws as pure-blooded Aryans.3 
Prince von Reuss, the German Minister in Tehran, was diligently working on 
strengthening the “National Government” established at Qum and Kermanshah by 
nationalistic leaders, while applying every influence on the Shah.4 The German 
aspirations persistently outlived the Russo-British invasion and expulsion of the 
German nationals. The inquiries into the Qashqa’i revolt in the south of Iran in May 
of 1943 revealed covert Nazi activities in collaboration with the southern tribes.5 The 
full account of the conspiracy came to light by 1954 and exposed some high-ranking 
Persian military commanders including General Zahidi, Nasir Khan and Deputy 
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Nobakht. Nazi spies, led in part by the expelled German diplomat Franz Mayer, 
penetrated the Persian territory to incite the Kurds and other receptive tribes to revolt, 
once the German troops reach the Persian frontiers. The sabotage was supposed to 
launch after the impending fall of Stalingrad in 1943.1 
Shah Reza Khan himself reportedly viewed the propagandistic activities of the 
Nazis with caution.2 Although he did not allow Germany to found an open fascist 
party in Iran, the Monarch apparently was not able to deter the German influence 
among his people.3 Mohammad Reza Pahlavi was a man of a few words. The true 
extent to which he personally endorsed or admired Hitler’s character traits and 
political success remains debatable. However, the Shah’s policy of procrastination 
and his declared neutrality in WWII cost him his status and his country even more of 
its autonomy. 
Overall lack of decisive action and an ambiguous position on the war went 
beyond the comfort levels of the British and Russian war cabinets. Observing a 
renewed popular interest in the swastika as an essential Indo-European (Aryan) 
symbol among the public of Iran’s citiesVII was more than they could bear.4 Sighting 
the possibility of German take-over, Soviet and British military forces invaded Iran 
and occupied the country for the duration of the war. The United States ambassador 
in Tehran reported to the Secretary of State Cordell Hull “the Iranians have arrived at 
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this predicament by their failure to recognize and face realities.”1 In turn, the 
Secretary of State responded to the Iranian Foreign Minister’s request for intervention 
to prevent the occupation by stating that “the United States had no intention of 
listening to Hitler discuss the merits of neutrality while conquering all other areas and 
eventually attacking the United States.”2 He also asserted that he “must warn Iran 
against Hitler’s stealthy approach, which is always based on a pledge of his supposed 
honor that he would not for the world attack a neutral country.”3 
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The ties between Hitler’s Germany and the Mediterranean neighborhood of 
the Muslim Arab world were much more direct and explicit. Between 1931 and 1935 
many Jews migrated to the British Palestine to escape the growing fanaticism of the 
Nazi regime in Germany. The new arrivals were met with resentment and anger from 
the local Arab population. Local Arabs feared that the increasing number of European 
Jews would add another obstacle to their economic and political struggle at the 
national level. The Arabs were divided politically and lacked a representative body 
like The Jewish Agency to work with the British authorities. Even though the British 
suggested forming such an institution, the Arab community failed to agree on the 
terms and rejected the notion of acquiescence to the Balfour Declaration and any 
cooperation with the Zionist movement. Although the opposition to Zionism was not 
unanimous, the more reactionary faction headed by Hajj Amin al-Husseini, the Grand 
Mufti of Jerusalem appointed by the British in 1921, gained the upper hand and 
secured significant political support and allegiance from several Muslim Arab 
political parties. The coalition formed a government body called the Arab Higher 
Committee in 1936. Not coincidently, the subsequent political development in British 
Palestine took a different course than in Lebanon, Transjordan, and Iraq, where 
constituent assemblies, parliaments, constitutions and other democratic practices of 
Western governments were tried to be implemented. 
Under the leadership of al-Husseini, the Arabs in British Palestine refused to 
legitimize the situation and rejected the principal of compromise. With the Jewish 
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population in British Palestine numbering 400,0001 by 1936 and increasing, 
intolerance toward the Jews resulted in one of the most violent Arab uprisings lasting 
up to 1939. Britain sent in 20,000 more troops, but accomplished little to contain the 
upheaval. The Mufti’s followers intimidated and killed the Arabs who were reluctant 
to take part in the armed rebellion.2 The Arab Guard Squads employed sporadic raids 
to sabotage the farm settlements of Jewish agricultural pioneers and communities 
where Jews, Christians and Arabs coexisted on friendly terms.3 Arson, bombings, and 
assassinations continued despite the strong British military presence, which was 
increased to 25,0004 servicemen in Palestine alone. In September of 1937, the British 
District Commissioner of Galilee was murdered, and England at last took its first 
significant action against the Arab Higher Committee. The British Colonial Office 
dissolved the body and arrested most of its higher-ranking members. Al-Husseini 
escaped to Lebanon, and eventually made his way to Berlin through Iraq, Iran, 
Turkey and Rome.5 Prior to 1937, he masterfully led the British to believe that he was 
their best candidate for an advisor on the British affairs in the land amidst other 
political entities.6 
The subsequent political course taken by British colonial government turned 
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sharply toward appeasement of Arabs for fear of further destabilization. The Palestine 
Royal Commission Report issued in July of 1937, known as the Peel Report, 
proposed the partition of the British Palestine into Arab and Jewish states citing the 
“irrepressible conflict”1 between Arabs and Jews and the desire of the Arabs for 
national independence coupled with their hatred and fear of the establishment of the 
Jewish National Home. Peel Report was followed by the White Paper issued by the 
British Government in May of 1939, which effectively declared that British Palestine 
was to imminently become an Arab state and that there would be no more Jewish 
immigrants allowed to enter the country. More over, according to the Peel Report, the 
status of every Jew who had emigrated since 1918 was to be reviewed and assessed 
for legitimacy.2 Despite the efforts by the Foreign Office to present the policy as not 
an appeasement of the Arabs and, to lesser extent, of the Nazis, the Muslim Arabs 
must have seen this as an outcome of Britain caving in under the pressure of force. In 
fact, this interpretation by the Muslim Arab leaders was confirmed later in 1944. 
Musa Alami, a representative of the Palestinian parties at the Arab Congress meeting 
in Alexandria in the autumn of 1944, advised the assembly that the reason the British 
retreated from the 1939 White Paper stipulations was “without any shadow of doubt 
their feeling that the Arabs are pusillanimous… and that therefore there is no danger 
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in incurring their anger.”1 The analysis suggested by Alami during that meeting of the 
Arab Congress became the basis for the Arab League actions, at least up to the end of 
1947.2 
In a larger picture, Britain was in a difficult negotiating position with little to 
offer. As in the previous period of standoffs preceding the First World War, the 
Colonial Office could not give up land despite its most openhearted rhetoric. 
Contrasted with Germany, which was promising the Ottomans and, later, the Arabs 
authority over their own domains, Great Britain could not afford to surrender any of 
the holdings. In a grandiose gesture of endowing the Muslim Arab leaders with 
autonomy, Germany had nothing to lose and much to gain. For Britain, on the other 
hand, bargaining with land chips in the Middle East could lead to very undesirable 
consequences such as antagonizing the Russians or French. 
There were also other external factors such as Iranian oil fields, the Persian 
Gulf, India, Southeast Asia, and the shipping routes. Thus, while Churchill advocated 
Britain’s non-acquisitive and non-expansive ambitions in North Africa after landing 
of British troops there in 1942, he unequivocally stated: “…in case there should be 
any mistake about it in any quarter. We mean to hold our own. I have not become the 
King’s First Minister in order to preside over the liquidation of the British Empire.”3 
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At the same time, the pressure on Britain and France to placate the local populations 
of the Middle East was greater than ever before. Before 1942, even their ally United 
States was voicing an opinion that holding on to mandated territories in the region 
could be more troublesome than beneficial. Mr. Engert, The US Consul General in 
Beirut, remarked to the Secretary of State in November 1941, “I agree that all 
unnecessary limitation of Lebanese independence merely to serve French vanity is 
undesirable and will not only be criticized locally but will be used by Nazi 
propaganda.”1 Some officials in the Foreign Office may have been ready to relinquish 
the mandated lands before 1942. Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs of 
Great Britain Mr. Murray, for example, found the statement of the British 
Government that the present plans for the independence of Syria did not involve a 
termination of the mandate “surprising”.2 
London eventually realized that Hajj Amin al-Husseini aimed higher than just 
upsetting Jewish plans for making a home in British Palestine. However, the British 
authorities still did not see, or ignored the full extent of his malice potential, as they 
did not even ask the French authorities to extradite him from Lebanon in 1937. As 
late as 1940, the British Intelligence was still of the opinion that the general fear of a 
German invasion and occupation of the Arab lands held by many Arab notables in 
Iraq and Transjordan extended to the Mufti and his following. In reality, the Mufti’s 
fear of a German occupation was a concern that the Germans would start “using 
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Palestine and the nearby Arab countries as a dumping ground for all Jews who come 
within their domination.”1 
On the other hand, the expulsion of the Mufti and cracking down on the Arab 
Higher Committee did not defuse the Arab nationalistic movement. On the contrary, 
it seemed to spread it beyond British Palestine. By 1938 the unrest rocked most of 
rural Arab population. Arabs inside the occupied territory began receiving aid from 
those in neighboring Arab countries. Thus, the Syrian militia leader Fawzi al-Qawuqji 
entered the area from the north and together with Syrians and Iraqis attacked British 
installations. 
In this atmosphere in mandated Palestine, Great Britain arrived at the next 
stage of escalation of hostilities with Germany. As the global conflict became more 
imminent, the British were anxious to have secure bases in North Africa and the 
Middle East. More importantly, they could not afford to alienate the Muslim 
populations in India and in the other corners of the Empire. The Peel Report of 1937 
and White Paper of 1939 reflected those concerns restricting Jewish immigration and 
charting the forthcoming Arab autonomy.2 
The Arabs may have seen the policy of appeasement as a victory of armed and 
decisive resistance – a victory of Jihad. However, it was not a victory attained by 
Arab resistance alone. Jihad acquired a new powerful friend – Adolf Hitler. Previous 
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years of fighting the British had gotten the Muslim Arabs nothing more than 
imprisonment and exile; and, as little as, a hint of an alliance with Nazi Germany 
produced an outcome nearly resolving two most burning issues for the Muslim Arabs 
– Jewish immigration and independent statehood. In reality, the cause and effect 
relationship between the facts was not direct at all; but, for the inhabitants of the land 
familiar only with the language of power, the takeaway message seemed loud and 
clear. 
By the end of 1939, having been deported from the British Palestine, al-
Husseini escaped from French occupied Lebanon disguised as woman and arrived in 
Baghdad, where he was welcomed as a pan-Arab hero and a defender of the faithful.1 
Not coincidently, a well-organized pro-Nazi coup d’etat installed General Rashid Ali 
el-Gailini in power in Iraq on April 1, 1941. In a swift response the British suppressed 
the uprising by the end of May before the German and Italian paratroopers could 
assist it. At the same time, Rashid Ali’s attempted coup triggered another immediate 
consequence. To stop the transport of arms into Iraq by the Vichy French 
government, the British were prompted to invade Lebanon and Syria. The Free 
French, who assisted the assault, gained the official political control in Syria and 
increased the pressure against the Arab nationalist movement.2 De Gaulle was 
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adamant that crushing Arab nationalism was vital to the national existence of France.1 
The Mufti and his Iraqi supporters wasted no time to blame the failure of the 
coup on the ancient and indigenous Jewish population of Iraq, and called for 
murderous pogroms against them. This time their rhetoric sounded much more 
formulated and shrewdly tied to the current events, as if someone had counseled 
them. Hajj Amin and the deposed Iraqi leaders accused the Jews in being loyal 
servants and spies of Great Britain in exchange for the Balfour Declaration and 
establishment of Jewish home in British Palestine.2 
In 1932, newly independent Iraq signified its formal status by joining the 
League of Nations under the leadership of king Faisal bin Hussein. However, hostility 
toward Britain did not subside; and, in the subsequent years, the ideology of Arab 
nationalism sprung up fanned by the Nazi propaganda. 
The anti-Jewish pogroms of 1941 in Iraq resembled the infamous 
Kristallnacht in Nazi Germany in November of 1938. The 48 hours of murder, 
mutilation, rape, pillaging and burning marked the end of 2,600 years of Jewish life 
and culture in Mesopotamia.3 With nearly six hundred Jews murdered and the 
violence reaching all corners of Iraq, this carnage was the first hostility of its scale in 
the region in centuries. This event would be forever burned in Iraqi Jewish memory 
as Farhud – a cataclysm beyond chaos in Arabic.
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Nazism acquired followers in the rest of the Middle East as well. The notions of 
supremacy fed the invigorated flames of ethno-centric nationalism. In Egypt a youth 
militia was formed under the name of Young Egypt. It was later known as The Green 
Shirts. In the mid 1930s it included young Gamal Abdel Nasser among its ranks. The 
Green Shirts adopted a slogan that sounded very close to a slogan chanted by the 
Hitler-Jugend – “One People! One Party! One Leader!” In addition to the paramilitary 
uniforms, martial boasting and cult of leadership, the Mizr al-Fatat, or Young Egypt, 
espoused the same Judeo-phobia as their German heroes. Ahmad Husayn, the founder 
and leader of Mizr al-Fatat, wrote in the movement’s journal, “They (Jews) are the 
secret of this religious and moral decay, to the point that it has become correct to say 
– search for a Jew behind every depravity”1 Well into the 1960s, Green Shirts 
collaborated with the American neo-fascist National Renaissance Party, founded in 
1949 as a spin-off from the German American Bund, on the grounds of the 
inescapable overlap in beliefs and views on international policy.2 The 1939 upsurge 
in Axis Nazi propaganda against Anglo-Jewish imperialism calling for “Egypt for the 
Egyptians”3 outlived the costly victory in the war and the Nuremburg justice. 
Lieutenant-Colonel Anwar al-Saddat himself expressed his admiration for 
Hitler in a public forum. In 1953 responding to a question from a prominent Egyptian 
weekly Al-Mussawar on what he would offer to the Fuhrer should he return, he stated 
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this: 
Dear Hitler, I welcome you back with all my heart. You have been 
defeated, but in fact one should regard you as the real victor. There will be no 
peace in the world until Germany again takes first place. Your principal 
mistake was in opening too many fronts, but everything has been forgiven, for 
you are a shining example of belief in one's fatherland and people. You are 
eternal, and we shall not be surprised, if we see you again, or a second Hitler, 
back in Germany.1 
 
Lower ranking Egyptian ministers and preachers praised Hitler just as loudly 
throughout the post-war period. The Minister of Hygiene Dr. Noureddine Tarraf 
openly declared Hitler a “man of his life” and an “ideal leader.”2 Egyptian Army 
officers welcomed Otto Remer, who had saved Hitler’s life in the General’s Plot in 
1944, as the expert who would structure the Arab military after General Rommel’s 
Afrika Korps.3 Colonel Otto Skorzeny became a personal military and geopolitical 
advisor to Colonel Nasser. As the mastermind of the network of the evacuation routes 
for the Nazi criminals escaping persecution in post-war Europe, Skorzeny hit the 
jackpot in Egypt. Otto’s father in-law and Hitler’s former personal financial wizard 
Dr. Hjalmar Schacht advised him to relocate there as the most welcoming place to the 
ideology of National Socialism close to Europe. By 1959, Skorzeny, with full support 
and encouragement from the Egyptian military regime, worked under the facade of an 
export-import company in Cairo. For years he traded illegal arms, manned the 
Muslim Arab armies with former Wehrmacht soldiers, promoted anything anti-
                                                
1 Sedar and Greenberg, Behind the Egyptian Sphinx, 59. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Ibid. 
  52 
American, anti-British or anti-Israeli.1 He continuously insisted that Gamal Nasser 
had to be accepted as the new Egyptian Fuhrer by all members of the military. From 
the European branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, he set up recruitment centers in 
Europe. Those on the territory of Soviet occupied Eastern Europe operated with a full 
knowledge of Moscow.2 Some of the famous personalities of the Nazi SS and 
Gestapo found their second birth in the new neo-Nazi world. Known as the “Butcher 
of Warsaw”, General Dirlewanger became Nasser’s special advisor in guerilla 
warfare.3 Adolf Eichman, the coordinator of logistics behind the mass extermination 
of Jews, joined him as a military advisor before he moved on to Argentina.4 The list 
of names of the Nazis living under assumed identities or passing through the Middle 
East is estimated to be in the thousands, although official numbers vary. All of those 
who settled in Arab countries accepted new Arab names and many converted to 
Islam. Hitler himself, for an example, was known in the Muslim Arab world under his 
given Arab name of Abu Ali5. In Egypt alone, the numbers of arriving and residing 
former Nazi and Gestapo veterans were numerous enough to form a military unit 
named The Arab Foreign Legion by the early 1960s.6 In 1953, Sir Winston Churchill 
spoke to the House of Commons about the troublesome trend in the Arab militaries 
being aided and trained by the Nazi staff officers “in unusual numbers”.7 Those 
                                                
1 Ibid., 61-62. 
2 Ibid., 62. 
3 Ibid., 63. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Ibid., 59. 
6 Ibid., 64. 
7 Ibid., 67. 
  53 
political observers who were rather surprised at Nasser’s daring and decisive actions 
preceding the 1967 war with Israel should have known better. 
Syria broadly collaborated with the network of former Nazi and SS officers 
granting asylum to any former Nazi affiliate wishing to call it home. Among them 
was SS Hauptsturmführer Alois Brunner, one of the key figures in planning and 
execution of the Final Solution. He was confirmed to be still alive at the turn of the 
21st century living in Damascus under the name of Georg Fischer. Being a valuable 
advisor to the Syrian secret police, he was well protected by the Syrian government 
who denied all demands for his extradition.1 The leader of the Ba’ath party in Syria 
Sami al-Jundi wrote in his memoirs: “We were racialists. We were fascinated by 
Nazism, reading its books and the sources of its thought, especially Nietzsche’s… We 
were the first who thought of translating Mein Kampf into Arabic.”2 By 1950s, Mein 
Kampf, with anti-Arab passages carefully expunged, landed among the bestsellers in 
the Arab countries being prominently displayed in the windows of bookstores in 
Egypt and Syria.3 
At the same time as the favoritism toward Hitler’s Germany in the Muslim 
Middle East grew, one could observe the amalgamation of the religious radicals and 
political demagogues. After 1941, Muslim Brotherhood members solemnly said 
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prayers for an Axis victory in Europe at the opening of their meetings.1 The Grand 
Mufti of Jerusalem Hajj Amin al-Husseini issued a fatwa of Jihad against the British 
and the Jews as “the greatest foes of Islam”.2 A fatwa is a religious edict or ruling on 
an Islamic conduct issued by an Islamic scholar or a person of a spiritual authority. 
Hajj Amin al-Husseini may have been a prominent communal figure, but not a 
spiritual patriarch or an Imam. The same charlatan of self-nomination could be 
observed later in history, when Osama bin Laden, an impostor in a religious and 
spiritual hierarchy of Islamic religious authority (umma), declared Jihad against the 
Americans, British and Israelis after the first Gulf war of 1990.3 If Hassan al-Banna 
did not reach enough of the fanatical disciples East of Jerusalem by this point in time, 
the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem amplified the Muslim Brotherhood’s sentiment, 
officially making it a part of his political agenda.  
Historically never having been comprehensively separated, the religious 
obligations, tribal commitments and political duties of the Muslim Arabs now 
appeared aligned under the flag of Muftism by the onset of the World War II. 
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In August 1940, Hajj Amin al-Husseini’s German-speaking secretary, Uthman 
Kamal Haddad, smuggled al-Husseini’s correspondence personally addressed to 
Hitler into Germany. Under an assumed alias, Haddad stopped in Ankara for a 
meeting with Franz von Papen, German Ambassador to Turkey. Then he entered 
Berlin with papers in the name of Max Muller to meet with the foreign minister of 
Germany Joachim von Ribbentrop.1 In his writing, the Mufti presented himself as the 
most popular and the only Arab Muslim leader who enjoys the position to negotiate 
with Hitler on behalf of all Arabs. The independence of the Arab lands was not the 
exclusive theme of the approach. The address included an appeal for recognition of 
the Arab independence, to which Nazis agreed under the conditions of economic 
relations, continued Iraqi resistance, and the continued Palestinian revolt against the 
British. Nevertheless, the written correspondence contained strong-versed anti-
Semitic language outlining anti-Semitism as the basic foundation for the alignment 
between the followers of the Mufti and Hitler. It said in part “full of unvanquished 
faith, the Arabs of Palestine fought with the most elementary mutual hatred of the 
English and the Jews…”2 It should be noted that an overt Nazi commitment to Arab 
independence was an intricate matter at the time, as it could irritate Italy and France, 
each having imperialistic claims in the region.3 
The Grand Mufti himself arrived in Rome in October 1941. Immediately upon 
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his arrival he presented himself as head of the Arab National Party with clandestine 
branches throughout the Middle East.1 He requested a principal recognition of the 
independence and sovereignty of the Arab states including Iraq, Syria, and Palestine 
by Germany and Italy.2 Al-Husseini proposed cooperation between the fascist bloc 
and the aforesaid territories, which were already fascist in nature according to him. 
Hajj Amin al-Husseini hardly needed an introduction. German and Italian 
leadership already knew of his reputation. Mussolini himself extended large sums of 
money and luxurious accommodations to the Mufti.3 During their meeting in the 
Venezia Palace on October 27, Mussolini reportedly assured Hajj Amin, “The 
number of Italian Jews is not more than 45,000 out of an Italian population of 45 
million… each and every one of them is a spy and propagandist against us... They are 
our enemies… and there will be no place for them in Europe.”4 Hajj Amin al-
Husseini’s hatred of Jews was the common ground for his cooperation with the Nazis. 
His later claims that the only reason for his collaboration was the struggle against the 
British is groundless.5 Germany was the embodiment of the anti-Jewish sentiment; 
and the destruction of the Jewish National Home was a chief idea and one of the 
guiding principals of al-Husseini’s path.6 In his written communication to Ribbentrop 
dated July 25, 1944 in Berlin, the Mufti insisted that “the destruction of the so-called 
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Jewish National home in Palestine is an immutable part of the policy of the greater 
German Reich” and asked for “new practical example of the policy of the naturally 
allied and friendly Germany towards the Arab Nation.”1 
After obtaining assurances from Ribbentrop and Himler personallyVIII to 
destroy the idea of the Jewish National Home and annul the Balfour Declaration, al-
Husseini appealed to Hungarian, Bulgarian and Romanian governments to end their 
Jewish problem by closing all other emigration routes and deporting the Jews to 
Poland, if other means were not readily available locally.2 In his correspondence with 
the Nazi officials and their European figureheads, he pressed for personal assurances 
to ensure a punctual evacuation of European Jews to “… other countries where they 
would find themselves under active control, for example, in Poland…”3 Adolf 
Eichmann’s deputy Dieter Wisliceny stated in his testimony at the Nuremburg Trial 
the following: 
The Mufti al-Husseini was one of the proponents of the systemic 
extermination of European Jewry and had been a collaborator and advisor of 
Eichmann and Himmler in the execution of the plan… he was one of 
Eichmann’s best friends and had constantly incited him to accelerate the 
extermination measures. I heard him say he visited incognito the gas chamber 
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of Auschwitz accompanied by Eichmann.1 
 
The Saudi Kingdom was also found to be in active cooperation with the proxy 
of Nazism in the Middle East. The documents of the cooperation between the Axis 
and the Middle Eastern Muslim leaders was presented to the US Department of State 
by the Office of US Chief of Counsel For Prosecution of Axis Criminality from 
evidence collected in 1945. The summary of relevant points of the document 
numbered 792-PS contained the following lines:2 
1. Only through the funds made available by Germany to the Grand Mufti of 
Jerusalem was it possible to carry out the revolt in Palestine. (Page 1) 
2. Germany will keep up the connection with the Grand Mufti. Weapons will 
be stored for the Mufti with Ibn Saud in Arabia. (Page 2) 
3. Ibn Saud himself has close connections with the Grand Mufti and the 
revolting circles in Transjordan. (Page 2) 
4. To be able to carry out our work one of Germany’s agents will be placed 
in Cairo. (Page 3) 
5. The document is undated, but obviously written before the outbreak of the 
war in 1939. (Analyst Landmann) 
 
Neither were any of these documents brought up for discussions in the forums 
of the United Nations since the end of World War II. They may have been filed away 
in light of the impending oil production boom of the Saudi-USA co-owned 
ARAMCO, and due to territorial competition with the Soviet Union. Realpolitik held 
its sway. 
Having defeated Nazi Germany in the war the victor states seemed to quickly 
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have forgotten the Grand Mufti’s allegiances. On the contrary, they may have started 
to entertain possibilities of the political asset that this widely known Muslim Arab 
leader could hold. On the explicit orders of General de Gaulle, the Mufti was released 
from Cherche-Midi prison and quartered in a villa on the outskirts of Paris.1 The 
British feared a new eruption of anti-British sentiment in the Arab countries; and, 
therefore, did not support the demands for his extradition, while the Americans did 
not express any interest in the Mufti at all.2 In May of 1946, with a false Syrian 
passport and a genuine American military travel pass, he boarded a TWA plane in 
Paris.3 He landed in Egypt welcomed by his Nazi friends, also washed up on Egyptian 
shores. Yugoslavia repeatedly demanded extradition of the Mufti to be tried for war 
crimes and crimes against humanity with no results.4 Hajj Amin al-Husseini was 
lavishly hosted by King Farouk of Egypt. The Mufti settled in the Alayh resort and 
immediately sent a coded telegram to his followers in Jerusalem – “Papa has 
returned.”5 The man who appealed to Muslim volunteers6 under the Nazi military 
command: “Kill the Jews!.. This pleases Allah, history and religion..,”7 was not tried 
in Nuremberg as a Nazi accomplice. He died from natural causes in 1974 leaving 
                                                
1 Michael Bar-Zohar and Eitan Haber, Massacre in Munich: The Manhunt for the 
Killers Behind the 1972 Olympics Massacre (Guilford, CT: The Lyons Press, 2006), 
72. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Ibid., 73. 
6 Antonio J. Munoz, Hitler's Muslims: Muslim Volunteers in Hitler's Armies, 1941-
1945 (Bayside, NY: Europa Books, Inc., 2007), 8. 
7 Morse, The Nazi Connection to Islamic Terrorism: Adolf Hitler and Hajj Amin al-
Husseini., 67. 
  60 
behind a strong endorsement for a vile Jew-hatred, which Hence von Leers celebrated 
as “… the immortal contribution of the religion of Islam.”1 During his political 
career, the Mufti was named a local leader of the Muslim Brotherhood after its 
establishment in Jerusalem in the mid-1940s by followers of Hassan Al-Banna, 
elected President in absentia of the Arab Higher Executive (Fourth Higher Committee 
of the Arab League), was declared President of the All-Palestine Government set up 
by the first Palestinian National Council on October 1, 1948 in Gaza, headed the 
World Islamic Congress in Karachi in February 1951, participated in the NAM 
conference in Bandung, Indonesia in 1955 and served as President of the 1962 World 
Islamic Congress.2 No Muslim Arab leader since has repudiated him nor renounced 
his teachings and actions. 
The acceptance of Muslim Arab support was a calculated political move for 
Hitler. Earlier in his Mein Kampf, he wrote passages that revealed his real disposition 
toward the peoples of the Middle East. In his own words, far example, as a man of 
Germanic blood, he would, in spite of everything, rather see India under the English 
rule than any other.3 He wrote, “… as a nationalist who appreciates the worth of the 
racial basis of humanity, I must recognize the racial inferiority of the so-called 
“Oppressed Nations”, and that is enough to prevent me from linking the destiny of my 
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people with the destiny of those inferior races.”1 One of the leading Nazi theoreticians, 
Alfred Rosenberg, explicitly warned the white races to beware of “... the united 
hatred of colored races and mongrels led in the fanatical spirit of Muhammad.”2 
Conversely, SS chief Heinrich Himmler held more of a pragmatic view of the 
volunteers from the Muslim Middle East. In Himmler’s view, Muslim men would 
make perfect SS soldiers particularly in the ideological struggle against Judaism and 
Communism.3 He articulated, “Muslims are already opposed to Judaism. Their 
religion taught them that if they die in battle, they would immediately be sent up to 
heaven where their needs would be taken care of by a harem of beautiful women. 
What better religion a soldier could have?”4 Himmler was also known to remark that 
he regretted that Germany had adopted Christianity rather than war-like Islam.5 
Himmler complimented Islam’s attributes of blind obedience and readiness for self-
sacrifice in the relentless pursuit of its enemies – all SS qualities held by Himmler in 
highest regard.6 Comments like this may have been in jest, but the practical 
implications of having fans on the other side of the British front lines must have been 
extremely alluring. Indeed, if General Rommel crossed the sands of El Alamein in 
1942 with his Afrika Korps, the outcome of the WWII would undoubtedly look quite 
different. Himmler and Hitler quickly agreed that their racial theory could afford a 
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few exceptions in light of the circumstances. Hitler was not enchanted with 
Himmler’s neo-pagan mysticism, but readily agreed to let Islam be one of the SS 
religions.1 Each battalion had its Imam and Mullahs graduated from one of the two 
special Islamic religious schools established by the Nazis in Gottingen and Dresden 
respectively.2 The school in Dresden received the official blessing from the Grand 
Mufti of Jerusalem, where the term Grand had been added by the Nazis to embellish 
his status, Hajj Amin al-Husseini himself.3 
Waffen-Gebirgs Division der Waffen-SS Handschar was one of the SS 
divisions formed in Spring 1943 of Bosnian Muslim volunteers.4 The Division was 
over-subscribed – so much was the enthusiasm of the Bosnian Muslim to take up 
arms. The unit gained a reputation for brutality, especially among the Balkan 
Christian community, immediately after it had gone into action in 1944.5 One of the 
first actions of another Balkan Muslim division, 21 Waffen-Gebirgs Division der SS 
Skanderbeg, was gathering Kosovo’s Jews for deportation.6 The unit was implicated 
in atrocities against the civilian population in the area, was not a viable combat 
formation, and eventually was disbanded partly due to a high desertion rate.7 
Reichsfuhrer-SS Heinrich Himmler and the head of Waffen SS recruiting 
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office, General Gottlob Berger, formed SS units wherever they could exploit local 
nationalistic, anti-Semitic, and anti-Communist sentiments. The Ostturkischen 
Waffen Verbande der SS was ordered for formation personally by Himmler in 
October 1944.1 Originally it was intended to be formed of Tatars and Turks of South 
Russia. Later the unit was renamed Ostmusselmanische Division der SS (East Muslim 
Division of the SS) and supplemented by volunteers from Turkestan, Azerbaijan, 
Kirgizstan, Uzbekistan and Tadzhikistan.2 During the suppression of the Warsaw 
Ghetto uprising in July of 1944, the remnants of this division were attached to the 
infamous 21 thousand men strong3 Dirlewanger SS Penal Brigade, known for its 
gruesome atrocities.4 
Limited information is available about Lebanese volunteers during the same 
period. However, at least one account suggested that numbers of them might have 
been assigned to the Brandenburg 287th Special Purpose Regiment, comprised of non-
Germans and operating in North Africa.5 By September 1944, all the Brandenburg 
Division’s commando units were placed under command of Hitler’s soldier-
extraordinaire the legendary Colonel Otto Skorzeny.6 
In the end, Muslim recruits in the ranks of SS were never treated as equals by 
their German SS NCOs and officers, who referred to them in demeaning terms like 
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Muselgermanen (mud-German). Hundreds of them ended up in concentration camps 
and penal battalions, while dozens were executed by the firing squad for disobedience 
and desertions.1 Still, even in September 1944, the Handschar SS Division counted 
over eight thousand Muslim recruits within its formations.2 Meanwhile, Jews were 
enlisting in the armed forces as volunteers as well. Over thirty thousand Palestinian 
Jews fought in the ranks of the British army with thousands more in local garrison 
duty throughout the mandated Middle East.3 
Concurrently, the plight of the European and Middle Eastern Jewish 
population elicited some sympathetic response from the Muslim rulers of Tunisia and 
Morocco in the earlier periods of the war. They did not hide their distaste for the anti-
Semitic decrees being implemented in the surrounding them North Africa and 
Algeria. In 1942, The Sultan of Tunisia Munsif Bey declared his solicitude for “all 
the population of the Regency.”4 He went out of his way to restore the royal order of 
merit upon the Jewish population under his jurisdiction. The Sultan of Morocco 
Muhammad V also criticized any changes to the status of his population as illegal and 
proclaimed that in his view Jewish and Muslim subjects alike were equal.5 He vowed 
to the local leaders of Jewish Community that he himself would never lay a hand 
“upon either their persons or their property.”6 
There were other instances of Muslims offering help and assistance to their 
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Jewish neighbors amidst of the anti-Semitism upsurge, but the overall atmosphere of 
spiritual and political leadership of the Muslim Arab world at the time was 
overwhelmingly pro-German and indifferent to the persecution of the Jews within and 
outside of their lands.1 On the background of individual examples of help and 
compassion for the Jewish neighbors among the Muslims of North Africa, thousands 
of local Arabs fought on the side of either Vichy French forces or directly under the 
Nazi flag. In 1942-1943 and before desertions ensued toward the end of the war, 
Vichy French Arab formations counted fifty five thousand men in Morocco, fifty 
thousand in Algeria, and fifteen thousand in Tunisia.2 For most of them, the primary 
reason for their participation in the Nazi cause was not about what the Nazis had to 
offer them in return, but what would be destroyed in the outcome of the Nazi victory.3 
Ultimately, the more progressive Muslim leaders were made to sign German 
occupation agreements, as North Africa, including Tunisia and Morocco, fell under 
solid Nazi control by November of 1942.4 Winning the popularity among the local 
Arabs with ease, the Gestapo commenced the round up of the Jewish community 
members on November 23, 1942.5 By 1943-1944, the politics of al-Husseini and al-
Quwatli with Philippe PetainIX of Vichy France appeared to have the upper hand. 
After the collapse of the Ottoman Empire at the end of the World War I anti-
Semitism became a driving political force for pan-Arab Muslim nationalism. By the 
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time Jewish immigration to British mandated Palestine accelerated in the early 1930s, 
the hatred and xenophobia overshadowed any rational thinking in a political dispute 
over territory, borders or nationality. 
Persecution of Jews was not a new concept to the Mulsim inhabitants of the 
Middle East. Hitler’s Nazism validated it further by placing it on a racist and pseudo-
scientific ground beyond the exclusively religious context. The recognition of 
German power and Nazi Jew-hatred echoed deep into the Muslim Arab Middle East. 
In the words of one of the first leaders of the Syrian Ba’ath party Sami al-Jundi, “… 
Nazism was the power, which could serve as its champion…”1 When the Nazi party 
announced their laws on seizure of Jewish business and property in 1934, telegrams 
of congratulations were sent to Hitler from all corners of Arab world.2 The official 
foreign policy of the Third Reich recognized “… the right of Palestine and other Arab 
countries to solve the question of the Jewish elements in Palestine and in the other 
Arab countries as required by national Arab interests, and in the same way as the 
Jewish question in the Axis lands is being solved”3 – an old idea with a modern 
element for the psyche of the proponents of violent Jihad. Since 1948, the formation 
of the Jewish state in the heart of the Middle East is universally referred to as al-
nakba, or “the catastrophic disaster”, among the Muslim Arabs.X The anti-American 
and anti-Semitic propagandists strategically portray the State of Israel as the foot of 
American imperialism on the Dar al-Islam (Domain of Islam). Vehement anti-
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Semitism is an instrument that helps to maintain Jihad at a boiling point. The 
historians and politicians cannot afford to dismiss the catalyzing role of those 
communal and political Muslim Arab leaders who shaped the legacy we are facing 
today. Furthermore, this legacy may very well be engulfing the future Muslim 
political leaders and military officers who will be engaged in shaping the world 
affairs. Hajj Amin al-Husseini, Rashid Ali, Sami al-Jundi and Antun Sa’adaXI were 
not rogue mavericks, whose politics happened to coincide with those of Nazi 
Germany at the time. They were both, the products of their respective societies and 
the portals for the Nazi ideology back into the Muslim societies that would produce 
larger and more influential political Islamic groups in then future – now our present. 
 
  68 
III 
 
… in the big lie there is always a certain force of credibility; because the broad 
masses of a nation are always more easily corrupted in the deeper state of their 
emotional nature than consciously or voluntarily, and thus in the primitive simplicity 
of their minds they more readily fall victims to the big lie than the small lie, since 
they themselves often tell small lies in little matters but would be ashamed to resort to 
large-scale falsehoods. It would never come into their heads to fabricate colossal 
untruths, and they would not believe that others could have the impudence to distort 
the truth so infamously.1 
(Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf)XII 
 
 
In 2003, the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development 
published an article under the auspices of its Racism and Public Policy project 
directly pointing to the persistent xenophobia in the Middle East as experienced by 
the migrant workers in the region.2 What begs the question is how much the present 
day xenophobia in the Muslim Arab world was influenced by the late Nazi racist 
ideology. 
The military is an integral part of the Islamic political society. Military 
officers quite often make up the administrators, ambassadors, diplomats and attaches 
for the Arab regimes in the Middle East. By training young officers of the Arab 
armies, Otto Skorzeny’s network of the masters of Nazi propaganda left a lasting 
legacy. Many of them advanced to positions in information and education ministries 
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in Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Libya and other Gulf states. Not coincidently, the 
textbooks for schools and Universities in the region are full of explicit anti-Semitism. 
The state sponsored radio and television stations such as al-Manar, or The Beacon, 
broadcast hate-filled programming to millions of viewers.1 The Egyptian Radio Cairo 
during the times of Nasser’s government poured out volumes of anti-Western, anti-
Christian, anti-Israeli and anti-Semitic invective in every conceivable language and 
dialect of the land.2 The vocabulary employed in such broadcasts left nothing for the 
imagination. “Blood suckers”, “descendants of apes and pigs”, “white dog”, “human 
garbage” are only a few examples of the public discourse in the national radio waves 
over the Middle East.3 Statements such as, “The United States is made up of the 
refuse of the world molded together into a solid mass of crime, graft and corruption” 
and “American Middle Eastern foreign policy is one of political prostitution and 
vagrancy of those gathered in the United States from the scum of the earth” were 
issued as axioms of the popular political perspective.4 
The Nazi propaganda advisors living in the region since 1945 encouraged the 
development of radio and television media with a particular emphasis. They pointed 
out that the message should not have to wait for new literate generations, but should 
be reaching the uneducated Bedouin and other tribal communities starting 
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immediately.1 One of the high-ranking Nazi propaganda officials at the Nazi Foreign 
Ministry Johann von Leers himself headed the operations and content of the Radio 
Cairo and its affiliates in the 1950. By then, a convert to Islam, he was known under 
an assumed Arab name of Oman Amin von Leers.2 From Egypt von Leers fiercely 
attacked the Protestant Confessional Church for its opposition to Hitler in the neo-
Nazi publications of 1950s and glorified the natural similarities between the German 
and Arab peoples. He wrote that this explains “the moving humanitarian reception, 
which... thousands of German refugees found after the war among the Muslims of the 
Middle East. Islam’s simple all God doctrine, which is not tied to Judaism, and its 
enmity against the Jews won the allegiance of many of these refugees.”3 
Meanwhile, the sales of Kifahi, an Arabic edition of Mein Kampf distributed 
by the former Nazi chief of Deutcshe Press Agentur, Louis Heiden, known in Egypt 
under his Islamic name of Louis al-Hadsch, reached 911,000 copies between 1956 
and 1958 alone.4 
At the end of 1949, amidst this atmosphere of Pan-Arab nationalism pierced 
with former Nazi racist demagoguery Rahman Abdul Rauf al-Qudwa al-Husseini, 
matriculated to the University of Cairo.5 The new student would become known to 
the world as Yasser Arafat, the front man of the Palestine Liberation Organization or 
PLO. Arafat held Hajj Amin al-Husseini in the highest regard, referring to him as a 
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hero and a martyr, when it was politically expedient.1 The mission statement of the 
PLO was defined as destruction of the State of Israel and ridding the liberated 
Palestine of the Zionist occupants.2 It eerily resembled the Mufti’s goal in the 1940s. 
Although this time, the language used to describe the nature of the Zionist enemy 
comparing it to the Christian crusaders and Tatar invaders was more sophisticated.3 
Just as the Grand Mufti al-Husseini, Arafat objected to Israel’s right to exist in 
principal. He insisted that even if Israel withdrew form all the West Bank and Gaza, 
“the alien Zionist presence in our land” would remain as “the source of the 
aggression”.4 
PLO hordes left a blood trail everywhere they passed – Jordan, Lebanon, 
Israel, Syria, and Iran. After years of playing a destabilizing role in the Middle East, 
Arafat was awarded a Nobel Peace Prize in 1994 merely for having signed the 
Declaration of Principles with the Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin a year prior. 
PLO’s ties with ex-Nazis, such as Walter Baumann known as Ali Ben Khader and 
Erich Altern known as Ali Bella,5 to name only a few, were once again omitted. The 
association with the infamous proponent of Arab nationalism terrorist Carlos the 
                                                
1 Elpeleg, The Grand Mufti, 162. 
2 Muhammad Muslih, "Changing PLO Positions Toward Peace with Israel," in The 
Middle East and North Africa: Essays in Honor of J.C. Hurewitz, ed. Reeva Simon 
(New York, NY: Columbia University Press for the Middle East Institute of 
Columbia University, 1990), 138. 
3 Y. Alexander and H. Foxman, "The Chapter of Allah: The Platform of Islamic 
Resistance Movement Hamas," ed. Palestinian Authority of Gaza and West Bank 
(Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1990), Article 35. 
4 Rubin and Rubin, Yasir Arafat: A Political Biography, 38. 
5 Bat Ye'or, Eurabia: The Euro-Arab Axis (Lancaster, England: Fairleigh Dickinson 
University Press, 2005), 42. 
  72 
Jackal was not remembered either. Nonetheless, Carlos the Jackal, in turn, had a very 
close personal and professional connection to the “Black Banker,” Francois Genoud, 
a Swiss banker and a Nazi financier.  Reportedly the principal finance manager of the 
hidden Nazi Swiss assets, he bankrolled the legal defenses of Adolf Eichmann, Klaus 
Barbie and Carlos the Jackal.1 Genoud was a father figure to Carlos and, not 
surprisingly, anti-Semite and a Holocaust denier.2 He stated in his interview with a 
French journalist Pierre Pean, who was writing his biography, “I absolutely do not 
believe that there was a will for the Final Solution to eliminate the Jews... “3 
Peculiarly, Francois Genoud also bankrolled Ayatollah Khomeini’s exile in France 
before his return to Iran in 1979.4 By mid-1990s Nazi money within Genoud’s reach 
could no longer pay for PLO’s jihad, as Genoud died in 1996 while being under 
investigation himself. Such a close match in dates leaves in question at least some of 
Arafat’s underlying motives for agreeing to accept the Declaration. 
By signing the Declaration, Arafat presumably acknowledged and annulled 
the previous PLO articles of intolerance of Jews and Israel and recognized the right of 
Israel to exist. Following the accord, the emblem on the PLO flags depicting the state 
of Israel in green, as an undivided Palestinian entity under PLO’s authority, remained 
unchanged. The same could not be said of Arafat’s standings amongst his 
constituency. Since the signing of the declaration, his popularity as a leader of the 
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Arab nationalist movement in the region plummeted. The anti-Semitism, violence and 
hate did not. The semi-annual report on PLO’s compliance with the Declaration 
submitted to US Congress on March 30, 2001 documented the Palestinian Authority’s 
failure to take steps to ratify the accord. It detailed numerous violations of Palestinian 
commitments made in agreements with Israel. The report echoed many preceding and 
subsequent submissions in pointing out that the PA governed PLO factions had 
reneged on their pledge not to use violence, had failed to confiscate illegal weapons 
and protect holy sites, had released terrorists from Palestinian jails and had continued 
to incite the Palestinian public, including children, to use violence.1 
There was no separation between Church and State in classical Islam, unlike 
in the nations who became early adopters of Christianity. In Christendom, the co-
existence of two authorities sacerdotium and regnum, or God and Caesar, is accepted 
and validated by the supreme sanction of the founder of the religion. The heaven-sent 
kingship is obliged to observe the things that God’s and the things that are Caesar’s. 
In classical Islam there are not two powers, but one; and the question of separating 
them is fundamentally unnecessary. In traditional Islam, at least prior to the Ottoman 
Empire, there was no Muslim term for “the Church” as a virtual organization or 
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domain. All the different terms for Mosque denoted a physical place for prayer or a 
building, but not an abstract institution.1 
This is a distinct difference between the Islamic peoples and those who 
profess other religions. The danger of this predicament is that nationalistic prejudices 
may infiltrate the religious interpretation trickling across a thin or non-existent 
membrane between the secular and religious lives of the society. The same possibility 
is true for the religious prejudices being readily available for infiltrating the ideology 
of the nationalistic movement. In the context of Northern Ireland, it has been 
observed in Steven Bruce’s 1993 publication, “Only when religion does something 
other than mediate between man and God does it retain a high place in people’s 
attentions and in their politics.”2 When does religion do anything other than mediate 
between man and God? Graham E. Fuller suggests that religion steps in to play a 
prominent role in politics when existing political forces do not effectively meet the 
public’s needs.3 The Iranian Revolution, the Muslim Brotherhood, Hizb ut-Tahrir al-
Islami, Al-Quaeda, Jamaat-e-Islami, Fatah, Hamas and Hezbollah parties are the 
examples of such a void being filled with radicalism and extremism. The area of their 
overlap is where xenophobia, anti-Americanism, anti-Zionism and anti-Semitism 
converge to feed one another’s vigor. 
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A case study of the formation and evolution of Hamas (Harakat al-Muqawama 
al-Islamiyya fi Filastin) may serve as one of the contemporary examples of sprouting 
seeds of hate from the surviving Nazi style xenophobic anti-Semitism. It appeared as 
a wing of the Muslim Brothers in Palestine in 1988. Financed by Saudi money, future 
Hamas members already controlled 40 per cent of mosques in Gaza and the largest in 
the territories Islamic University by 1986. Ironically, the Israeli occupation authorities 
supported Hamas, at its inception, as a useful political tool in counterbalancing the 
Palestinian nationalism of the PLO. The former Israeli military governor of Gaza, 
General Yitzhak Segev, was quoted in “A Special Report on Religious 
Fundamentalism” in 1988 stating “We extend some financial aid to Islamic groups 
via mosques and religious schools in order to help create a force that would stand 
against the leftist forces which support the PLO.”1 
In August of the same year, reacting to the erupting Intifada, the Muslim 
Brothers published “The Covenant of the Islamic Resistance Movement”. The 
Covenant blended within itself a puritanical version of Islam, an accommodation to 
PLO’s Nationalism and a recital of European anti-Semitism. Territorial nationalism, 
by itself previously rejected by the Muslim Brothers as idolatry, became combined 
with a religious claim. The document did not observe any distinctions between anti-
Zionism, religious strife and anti-Semitism. Jews were named responsible for the 
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murder of the prophets, the Second World War, the League of Nations, and 
instigating the corruption in the Muslim society.1 
Subsequent to the issue of the Covenant, which practically mirrored the PLO’s 
political manifesto, Hamas pledged unity with their “PLO brothers” rudely 
awakening the Israeli military authorities, who persistently assumed that the Islamic 
social conservatism must be the same as the secular political one. The crystal ball 
approach to policy-making resulted in a painful recoil for the Israeli administration. 
One must appreciate the optimism in the peace making efforts of the Israeli 
administration. In the summer of 1988, then Israeli Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin 
personally met with prominent Islamists including Mahmud Zahar and Ibrahim 
Yazuri for peace talks, despite the prolific Hamas propaganda labeling the Jews as the 
sons of apes and swine. Before the end of 1989, after Israeli intelligence confirmed 
that Hamas had been behind kidnapping and killing of Israeli soldiers, Israeli 
administration moved to the diametrically opposite end of the spectrum and 
proclaimed the movement illegal.2 
Essentially, Israeli policy makers made the same miscalculation at the 
negotiation table as their British predecessors – they offered peace in hopes to 
mitigate hate. Hate, in this context, is not a consequence of the conflict, but rather a 
reason for one. Contempt for one’s foe can be tamed, once hostilities are restrained or 
concessions extended. However, when hate is the ideology of one’s foe, a gift of 
peace will do little to revise it. General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq, Saddam Hussein al-
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Majid al-Tikrit, Mulah Mohammed Omar, Sheikh Ahmed Ismail Yassin, Hassan 
Nasrallah and Yasser Arafat are only a few names of Islamists whose conventions 
were not affected by granted concessions intended to pacify them. The same could be 
observed about Mohammad Hajj Amin al-Husseini, who received Palestine from the 
British, or Adolf Hitler, who received Czechoslovakia from Chamberlain. 
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... the conflict with the Zionist enemy has never been a border issue, nor an interstate 
conflict but rather a total confrontation concerning the survival of our [Arab] 
nationalism . . . against threats posed by the Israeli entity. 
(Syrian columnist Khayri Hama in Syrian daily Al-Ba'th, 1994)1 
 
 
 
The psychological position of Nazi Germany in the Middle East was much 
stronger during the Second World War than that of the Allies. There was a significant 
anti-British sentiment in the Arab countries, which was skillfully stimulated and 
exploited by the Nazi propaganda. While the Allies were confined within certain 
moral principals, the Axis unscrupulously used any preposterous lie to their 
advantage.2 In the post WWI period, British colonial power was more equitable and 
more humane than any foreign rule in the past,3 and the Axis propaganda could not 
subvert the known facts about British governance. For example, the Arabs were very 
well aware that Britain did not levy tributes, but, instead, often paid subsidies; that 
she did not make requisitions, but made purchases paid for in cash; and that London 
provided humanitarian relief, which helped Arabs to avoid many shortages and 
inconveniences especially during war time. Furthermore, instead of using the Middles 
Eastern countries, Britain enabled them to thrive and accumulate considerable 
financial wealth in British banks.4 Henceforth, Nazi propaganda focused on the 
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intractable Islamic anti-Semitism in the region, and exploited it to its fullest. Hitler’s 
war against the Jews may have supplied an additional validation to the traditional 
Islamic anti-Judaic prejudices. 
Present day discourse in the Muslim Arab media and academia remains full of 
anti-Semitic rhetoric. The Muslim Arab society has never judged the deeds of the 
Nazi criminals as inhumane and hateful. While European and American societies 
learned the consequences of hate or racist propaganda, in the Middle East no debate 
of the lessons of WWII ever really took place. The absence of public forum, within 
which the behavior of a nation could be discussed and critiqued, lead to a collective 
blindness to the subject matter. In contrast to the United States and Europe, where 
public debates about slavery and civil rights, among other issues, helped the societies 
heal and advance toward reconciliation; the Muslim Arabs do not criticize or 
condemn the actions of their past Islamic leaders. This may be because for most 
Muslims, as Nonie DarwishXIII suggested, “... criticizing jihad, martyrdom or 
terrorism seems in their minds – rightly or wrongly – to be equivalent to criticizing 
Islam itself.”1 Bernard Lewis wrote this on the topic: 
… we may, indeed, must study the history of Atlantic slavery and 
expose this great shame in the history of the Western world and the Americas 
north and south, in all its horror. This is a task, which falls upon us as 
Westerners and in which others may, and should, and do, join us. In contrast, 
however, even to mention – let alone discuss or explore – the existence of 
slavery in non-Western societies is denounced as evidence of racism and 
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imperialistic designs. The same applies to other delicate topics as polygamy, 
autocracy, and the like. The range of taboos is very wide.1 
 
The alliances with Nazi criminals and persecution of ethnic minorities fall 
securely within that range. Bernard Lewis masterfully outlined the dangers and 
consequences of stifling public debate about a nation’s health when he pointed out, 
We live in a time when great efforts have been made, and continue to 
be made, to falsify the record of the past and to make history a tool of 
propaganda; when governments, religious movements, political parties, and 
sectional groups of every kind are busy rewriting history as they would wish it 
to have been, as they would like their followers to believe that it was. All this 
is very dangerous indeed, to ourselves and to others, however we may define 
otherness – dangerous to our common humanity. Because, make no mistake, 
those who are unwilling to confront the past will be unable to understand the 
present and unfit to face the future.2  
 
Eerie as it may be to observe such a prophecy unfolding presently at the 
Muslim Arab societal frontier, the words and images on the pages of academic 
publications, religious sermons and journalistic media of the Muslim Middle East 
leave no room for second guesses. 
Children’s educational books from as early as third grade already contain 
references to Jews and Western Imperialists being the primary enemies of Arabs. It 
starts with simple statements establishing that Jews suffered persecution throughout 
history for their wickedness and evil conspiracies; and culminates with religious 
sermons that call the faithful to not compromise in fighting the enemies of Allah. The 
idea of martyrdom has become so ingrained in Palestinian social development that it 
is not only a major theme in religious practice, television broadcasting, posters and 
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pre-suicide eulogies, but a large part in programming of summer camps, children's 
trading cards, movies, music and games. Palestinian newspapers report that the 
number of children who express a willingness to become martyrs exceeds 70 
percent.1 In 2006, Palestinian psychiatrist Dr. Shafiq Massalha estimated that more 
than half of Palestinian children between 6 and 11 years of age dream of becoming 
suicide bombers.2 According to him, the next generation of Palestinians would be a 
very murderous population full of anger and hatred. 
Such social statistics in the Palestinian territories beg the question of whether 
or not assistance and unilateral foreign aid at all mitigate the rising hatred. Between 
1993 and 2006, the U.S. Agency for International Development in the West Bank and 
Gaza programmed an estimated $1.7 billion in financial aid coming from the United 
States alone.3 
Hate indoctrination played a critical role in mobilization of the cadres for 
violence and jihad particularly in Palestinian territories.4 The German hate 
propaganda machine intensified and emboldened the pre-existing prejudice and 
animosity in the region. 
Most of the adult oriented journalistic editorials, religious sermons, media, 
entertainment programming, and academic instructional materials closely resemble 
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the elements used to vilify the Jews by the Nazi propaganda machine. A few 
examples follow below as a very abbreviated sample set:1 
 Al-Azhar Sheikh Muhammad Sayyid Tantawi, the highest-ranking 
cleric in the Sunni Muslim world, called the Jews "the enemies of Allah, 
descendants of apes and pigs." "Read history," called Al-Sudayyis in another 
sermon, "and you will understand that the Jews of yesterday are the evil 
fathers of the Jews of today, who are evil offspring, infidels, distorters of 
[others'] words, calf-worshippers, prophet-murderers, prophecy-deniers... the 
scum of the human race 'whom Allah cursed and turned into apes and pigs...' 
These are the Jews, an ongoing continuum of deceit, obstinacy, licentiousness, 
evil, and corruption..." 
 
 April 2002, weekly talk show on the Al-Jazeera satellite television 
station, "The Opposite Direction", which claims to have tens of millions of 
viewers across the world. The moderator, Dr. Faisal Al-Qassam, included in 
the discussion the opinion of a viewer who wrote in from the station's website: 
"The sons of Zion, whom our God described as the sons of apes and pigs, will 
not be deterred unless there is a real holocaust, that will destroy all of them at 
once, together with the traitors – those who collaborate with them, the scum of 
this [Islamic] nation." 
With regard to the fraud of the Holocaust… Many French studies have 
proven that this is no more than a fabrication, a lie, and a fraud!! That is, it is a 
'scenario' the plot of which was carefully tailored, using several faked photos 
completely unconnected to the truth. Yes, it is a film, no more and no less. 
Hitler himself, whom they accuse of Nazism, is in my eyes no more than a 
modest 'pupil' in the world of murder and bloodshed. He is completely 
innocent of the charge of frying them in the hell of his false Holocaust!! The 
entire matter, as many French and British scientists and researchers have 
proven, is nothing more than a huge Israeli plot aimed at extorting the German 
government in particular and the European countries in general. But I, 
personally and in light of this imaginary tale, complain to Hitler, even saying 
to him from the bottom of my heart, 'If only you had done it, brother, if only it 
had really happened, so that the world could sigh in relief [without] their evil 
and sin. (Al-Akhbar (Egypt), April 29, 2002) 
We have ruled the world before, and by Allah, the day will come when 
we will rule the entire world again. The day will come when we will rule 
America. The day will come when we will rule Britain and the entire world – 
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except for the Jews. The Jews will not enjoy a life of tranquility under our 
rule, because they are treacherous by nature, as they have been throughout 
history. The day will come when everything will be relived of the Jews - even 
the stones and trees, which were harmed by them. Listen to the Prophet 
Muhammad, who tells you about the evil end that awaits Jews. The stones and 
trees will want the Muslims to finish off every Jew. (Palestinian Authority 
TV, May 13, 2005) 
... for the second time, thanks to Hitler, of blessed memory, who on 
behalf of the Palestinians, revenged in advance, against the most vile 
criminals on the face of the earth. Although we do have a complaint against 
him for his revenge on them was not enough. (Al-Akhbar (Egypt), April 25, 
2001) 
In an article in the Egyptian government daily Al-Ahram, Egyptian 
Mufti Sheikh Dr. 'Ali Gum'a expressed his support of the resistance in 
Lebanon and stated that the lies of the "Hebrew entity" expose "the true and 
hideous face of the blood-suckers... who prepare [Passover] matzos from 
human blood”. (Al-Ahram (Egypt), August 7, 2006) 
 
The continuous Anti-Semitic barrage in the contemporary Muslim Arab media 
is well documented by MEMRI – The Middle East Media Research Institute, a 
project that is presently monitoring the discourse. Their online archives can be found 
at www.memri.org.XIV Even the limited examples chosen herein paint quite an 
explicit picture of the content in the public media forum of the Muslim Arab states. 
Political cartoons in totalitarian states could be an insight into what the 
governments of those states want their citizenry to embrace. For example, in the 
Soviet Union and Nazi Germany no wartime political cartoon expressing dissenting 
opinions could be printed.1 Of course, one of the leading themes in Nazi German 
press of the period was anti-Semitism paving the way for the policy of genocide. 
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Virulently hateful, the cartoons depicted Jews and Gypsies as not merely non-Aryans, 
but sub-human.1 This propaganda strategy is not difficult to understand. The 
publications containing such cartoons mostly targeted uninformed, undereducated 
readership that could be conditioned to support policies based on preposterous racial 
claims. Abundant propagandistic caricatures in the present Islamist anti-Semitic 
publications serve essentially the same principle. In addition to that, they observably 
lack originality. Arab and Iranian Cartoonists draw Jews as dominating the world, 
manipulating world governments, subverting international justice and scheming to 
indulge their greed. Most of the images appear as hardly changed copies of drawings 
circa 1939-1943.2 
Hate speech directed at either Americans, British or Jews can be found in 
virtually every medium of the Muslim Arab world. Some of the most prominent 
networks specifically located in the Middle East are Lebanese Media Group, al-Nour 
and al-Manar. Concurrently, operations of new Palestinian Muslim media networks 
grew since the Hamas victory in Gaza in 2007. 
Al-Manar (The Beacon), for instance, reaches ten to fifteen million viewers 
per day with around the clock coverage; while it enjoys the access to the international 
network of 12 satellite providers and advertising sponsorship of multinational 
corporations. Established in 1991 by Hezbollah, it was designed to play a role of an 
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operational weapon to incite hatred toward the United States and Israel.1 Its 
operational budget, comprised mostly of Iranian money, has grown from one million 
dollars in 1991 to fifteen million dollars by 2002.2 Viewers and listeners of al-Manar 
are constantly being reminded of the most sacred way to fulfill one’s divine 
obligations – Jihad.3 
Blatantly anti-Semitic and anti-Christian, al-Manar is more than just a 
propaganda tool. It is regularly advertising for the benefit of those organizations that 
seek to recruit suicide bombers, raise money and enlist new agents for the covert 
operations against United States interests and Israel. In 2006, Al-Manar has been 
deemed a Specially Designated Global Terrorist Entity (SDGT) by the United States 
Treasury Department.4 The Treasury highlighted the role of al-Manar in recruiting 
and fundraising for Hezbollah, as well as its function in the surveillance and 
intelligence for the terrorist attacks and suicide bombings. Subsequent to that, and 
largely due to the illumination of the network’s background by the Washington 
Institute for Near East Policy, many prominent corporations including Coca-Cola, 
Pepsi and Western Union has withdrawn millions of dollars in their corporate 
advertising with the network. However, thanks to the proxy of major satellite 
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providers like Arab League-owned Arabsat, a subsidiary of France Telecom 
GlobeCast, and the Egyptian government-owned Nilesat, al-Manar continues to 
broadcast messages of incitement and violence to Muslim population in the Middle 
East and Europe.1 Al-Manar is widely popular among the Muslims living in Europe 
and particularly among those who speak only Arabic. Despite a sharp increase in acts 
of violence and extremism among Europe’s Muslims, European officials have not 
taken any decisive steps to act against incitement of hate sponsored by the Middle 
Eastern partners.2 
After conquering Gaza in 2007, Hamas initiated its own broadcasting of hate 
and Jihadi martyrdom via its television station al-Aqsa TV. Bankrolled by the same 
Saudi and Egyptian sponsors, even the comparatively miniature al-Aqsa TV in a 
narrow Gaza strip has access to the European airwaves. 
Concerns should be raised over reports that the Muslim schools in Europe, 
United States and Canada teach the hatred of Jews and anti-Americanism. The young 
Muslim community in several Islamic schools in the leading world democracies is 
being subverted to acquire a sense of alienation from their own country. 
In his 2005 expose in the New York Sun, Daniel Pipes highlighted various 
reports from the cities including New York and Washington DC about practices of 
hate speech, vilification of other religions and denigration of the American 
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citizenship.1 The initial reaction from the leaders of Muslim community has been 
reported as “shocked”; however, any further pressure by local politicians, journalists 
and activists on the schools to scrutinize their instructors and curriculum and to 
become transparent came up short. 
Interestingly enough, one event organized by the student association of the 
Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) in 2004 featured William W. Baker, 
who was internationally known as a neo-Nazi.2 Since these event and their details are 
not publicly advertised, similar examples could be much more numerous than only a 
few. 
According to PEW Research Center’s “Muslim Americans” study published 
in May of 2007, nearly half of Muslims in the US (47%) think of themselves first as 
Muslim, rather than an American. When asked whether they believed that groups of 
Arabs carried out the attacks against the United States on September, 11, 2001, 28% 
said they did not believe it, and 32% said they did not know or declined to answer. 
38% of Muslims under the age of 30 reject the possibility that the 9/11 attacks were 
carried out by a group of Arabs. Could this be relevant to the reports on predicaments 
in Islamic education and the unbridled barrage of hate speech in Muslim media? 
Still, the data sets gathered in the United States leaves us with more hope than 
the ones collected in Europe or the Middle East. Much more so than their European 
and Middle Eastern counterparts, the American Muslims are concerned about the rise 
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of Islamic extremism around the world (76%), concerned about the rise of Islamic 
extremism in the United States (61%) and believe that a solution can be found for 
Israel to exist so that the rights and needs of Palestinian Arabs are met (61%) – a view 
not shared by Muslim in the Arab countries.1 
Why is such background information indispensably important for the Western 
policy makers? Because when refusing to observe the facts, as uncomfortable as they 
may be, politicians are bound to suffer from narrow-sightedness. Such narrow-
sightedness leads to empowering those who undermine cooperation and pluralism. 
British, American and Israeli policy makers backed numerous governments in South 
America, Africa and Middle East, whom they had to face later in a military 
confrontation paying high tolls with the lives of their soldiers and civilians. Such 
governments and organizations include the PLO, Ba’ath Party, Hamas and the 
Taliban, to name only a few. The presumed pragmatism of striking an accord with an 
ideological adversary did not produce desired results. Similar parallels in 
appeasement of the raging hate monger could be traced in history back to concessions 
of Chamberlain and Stalin to Hitler and the British Colonial Office to Hajj Amin al-
Husseini. While choosing the high road of integrity may seem as an idealistic utopia, 
the alternative of playing the multi-level game of real politik has not gotten the 
Middle East any closer to peace or cooperation.
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CONCLUSION 
 
Peace with Jews is Blasphemy 
Political slogan of Hamas 
 
… when they will love their children more than they hate us… 
Golda Meir, Prime Minister of the State of Israel 1969-1974 
 
 
The world media and political circles have not sufficiently acknowledged 
Nazi Germany’s ties and influence in the Muslim Arab world. Hitler’s Mein Kampf 
remains among the top sellers in the region even at the cost of $10XV.1 Luis al-Haj, 
the translator, wrote in his preface, "National Socialism did not die with the death of 
its herald. Rather, its seeds multiplied under each star."2 Virulent anti-Semitism is one 
of the similarities National Socialism, or ethno-centric nationalism, and Global 
Islamism continue to share in common.3 
Whether the aforementioned Arab Muslim leaders looked up to Nazi Germany 
because of their religious beliefs, or because they had propensity for despotism, 
nationalistic domination, and thirst for power is less important to us than what the 
present generation knows and makes of it. Those who followed their lead reinforce 
the front along the fault lines of cultural, religious, political, and economic frictions in 
the Middle East and beyond. The way of the Hajj Amin al-Husseini is alive today 
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through the likeminded individuals who choose to carry on his views. 
Nazi style anti-Semitism has adversely impacted Muslim-Jewish relations, 
leaving behind long lasting fallout. Vilification of Jews and anti-Semitism is as much 
a state-sponsored article of faith today in most of Muslim Arab nations as it was in 
Nazi Berlin. The racist and nationalistic legacy of Hajj Amin al-Husseini and his 
contemporaries remains a burden on the Arab conscience. 
Hugh Trevor-Roper, a British historian sent to Jerusalem by the Sunday Times 
to cover the 1961 Adolf Eichmann trial wrote this in his editorial: 
Nazis are far more alive to Israel than to us. Like the Jews, their 
enemies too have now gone East. If several Nazi war-criminals escaped to 
South America, to lie low, many more have escaped to the Arab countries, to 
put their Nazi anti-Semitism and their German efficiency at the disposal of the 
new nationalist rulers of the Near East, who also have their “Final Solution” 
for the Jews who have settled in their midst.1 
 
This malignancy was allowed to go on to further penetrate political, religious 
and social forces of the Muslim Arab states. Turning away from the history and 
selectively closing our eyes to its facts will not help the world erase the divides 
between the Islamic and the non-Islamic, the West and the East or the democratic and 
the monarchial. 
After 1945, the United States Department of State concentrated its efforts on 
more global goals of foreign policy. It demonstrated great insight and efficiency in 
preventing the Soviets from gaining footholds in the Middle East in 1945 and 
thereafter; while Moscow, feeding its own ambitions to make inroads into the Near 
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East,1 issued its renewed endorsement of Hajj Amin al-Husseini after the end of the 
war.2 Realpoitik lead the Soviet policy makers to the same Arabs who were striking 
deals with the Nazis during the war. Without gravely alienating USSR, the State 
Department was able to neutralize Soviet interests in Lebanon, Syria and Palestine, 
kept USSR away form the Persian Gulf, defused the Soviet anti-imperialist and pro-
nationalist propaganda, while accepting USSR as an authoritative regional power in a 
large part of the Mediterranean basin.3 Concurrently, Washington diminished 
Britain’s ability to act unilaterally, while making her a junior partner in the Anglo-
American front in the Middle East.4 The State Department’s skill at the balancing 
game in the post war period was second to none. Unfortunately, it did not encompass 
initiatives to cleanse the region of the hate elements and organizations. 
In the end, the State Department’s selective pseudo pluralism hurt the interests 
of minorities in the Middle East. The Department opposed geo-political aspirations of 
Jews, Maronite Christians, Kurds and Assyrians – paradoxically all those who did not 
align with the Axis during the war – out of fears for inadvertently creating power 
vacuums and alienating the Sunni Arabs.5 In the view of State Department, endorsing 
pluralism in perpetuity was a practice of bad imperialists, who conspired to divide 
and rule.6 Moreover, Washington postulated that deep-rooted minorities, despite their 
                                                
1 George W. Breslauer, Soviet Strategy in the Middle East (London, England: 
Routledge, 1990), 10. 
2 Baram, The Department of State in the Middle East 1919-1945, 108. 
3 Ibid., 115. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Ibid., 327-28. 
6 Ibid., 328. 
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communal and cultural differences with the rest of the populace, were supposed to be 
absorbed within the native majority, just like they were absorbed in the United 
States.1 At the very same time, Sir Winston Churchill and many in the British Foreign 
Office believed that Jewish and Arab dreams of statehood were reconcilable and 
partition was a viable course.2 In very basic terms, the US Administration fell short of 
distinguishing a national independence movement from its destructive shadow – 
ethno-centric exclusionary nationalism. 
In retrospect, the wartime wishes of US Navy and the State Department’s 
counterpart Department of War to build a pipeline independently from ARAMCO 
and, perhaps, establish a protected enclave at Dhahran3 might seem healthier than 
elevating Ibn Saud, a Third Reich sympathizer and an avid anti-Semite,4 from a 
wealthy local sheik to a dominion over the life blood of the world economy. 
The heritage of hate will continue to morph and metastasize if left 
unchallenged. A constructive critique of this chapter of Muslim Arab history should 
not be viewed as purely anti-Arab or as a demeaning attack on Islam. To see it as 
such would be the same as to suggest that a criticism of Lenin’s Communism is anti-
Russian, criticism of Napoleonic conquest is anti-French or criticism of Hitler’s 
National Socialism is anti-German. 
The educational publications in the Arab world are full of indictments against 
                                                
1 Ibid. 
2 Ibid., 258. 
3 Ibid., 324. 
4 John Loftus and Mark Aarons, The Secret War Against the Jews: How Western 
Espionage Betrayed the Jewish People (New York, NY: Macmillan, 1997), 68. 
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the supposed Western and Jewish conspiracies, no matter how contemptible those 
teachings may be. Concurrently, the majority of Western academics are shy of any 
meaningful acknowledgement of the facts relevant to the subject derived from the 
modern history of the Middle East. Among many possible examples, A Concise 
History of the Middle East (2005), by Arthur Goldschmidt and Lawrence Davidson, 
is a 559-page volume. Frequently referenced and selected as a text source for many 
university courses across the United States, it covers the periods of both world wars, 
the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and details the profile of Hajj Amin al-Husseini; while 
saying absolutely nothing about his involvement with Hitler. On the contrary, it 
directly advocates that“… it is historically incorrect to regard him as a Nazi”.1 It goes 
on to assert: “He was the leader of a nationalist movement fighting against British 
Imperialism and Zionist colonialism.”2 It does, however, depict the Mufti – the man 
who was personally received by Hitler and recruited hundreds of Muslim volunteers 
for the Nazi SS Brigades – as “a hero to the Palestinian Arabs”.3 
Regrettably, most of the leading publications, including those cited in this 
paper, do not challenge the pacified rendition of the calamitous alliance of the 
Muslim Middle East with one of the principal enemies of the modern civilization – 
Nazism. Could this be why anti-Americanism is measured at its highest levels since 
the nineteenth century in the Arab world? 
Dr. Akbar Ahmed, Ibn Khaldun Chair of Islamic Studies at the American 
                                                
1 Arthur Goldschmidt Jr. & Lawrence Davidson, A Concise History of the Middle 
East, Eighth ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2005), 282. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Ibid. 
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University in Washington DC, is one of the world’s leading authority on 
contemporary Islam.XVI Dr. Ahmed is a former Pakistani Ambassador to Great 
Britain and the author of several books including Journey Into Islam: The Crisis of 
Globalization and Islam Under Siege. In order to stimulate a dialogue promoting a 
Muslim-Jewish-American understanding, he embarked upon a cross-country initiative 
teaming up with the father of the murdered American journalist Daniel Pearl, Dr. 
Judea Pearl. Citing his personal surveys and research for Journey Into Islam, Dr. 
Ahmed expresses a concern that xenophobia and anti-Semitism are at their highest 
particularly among the younger population of the Muslim Arab world.1 A collective 
amnesia with respect to the Nazi ideological presence in the region will not help to 
reverse the trend. Withholding a component of the historical matrix could only lead to 
a biased historical perspective. In the words of Golda Meir, “One cannot and must not 
try to erase the past merely because it does not fit the present.” 
Could this be why the progressive Muslims like Nonie Darwish are labeled 
infidels and blasphemous traitors of Islam by the Islamists? Perhaps, that is why Syria 
– the cradle of the Ba’ath party, which was inspired by and copied after Hitler’s 
National Socialist German Workers’ Party2 – has been allowed to be a permanent 
member and a chair of the U.N. Security Council? Could this be why Western 
intellectuals regressed to equate the only democracy in the stifling theocratic climate 
                                                
1 Akbar S. Ahmed, Journey Into Islam: the Crisis of Globalization (Washington DC: 
Brookings Institution Press, 2007). 
2 Michael Curtis, ed., Proceedings of the annual conference of the American 
Academic Association for Peace in the Middle East, People and Politics in the Middle 
East (New Brunswick, NJ: transaction Books, 1971), 135-37. 
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of the Middle East with apartheid and blame Israelis for their own demise?XVII Is it 
due to looking at the Middle East history through a dimmed prism, President Carter 
was determined to see Yasser Arafat as a man of peace in the 1970s? Fifteen years 
later in 1994, Yasser Arafat, the heir of hate and a master terrorist, was awarded the 
Nobel Peace Prize by the international community. Another five years later, PLO 
under the command of Yasser Arafat unleashed the worst yet reign of terror (intifada) 
upon Israeli civilians. The dimmed prism will continue to render visions similar to 
those seen through a kaleidoscope, if history is ignored. 
If there is an ongoing conflict between the antagonists on the collision course 
to war, as we are lead to believe vis-à-vis the concept of the Clash of Civilizations, it 
very well could be the conflict between irreconcilable general entities of 
“chauvinism” and “pluralism,” rather than specifically between Chino-Islamic and 
Judeo-Christian civilizations, as Samuel Huntington might have proposed. Bigotry, 
racism, anti-Semitism and xenophobia are very likely symptoms of this hate-induced 
divide. 
However, entering the twenty first century, American policy makers still 
tended to follow the old playbook. At the Wye Plantation Summit in 1998, Yasser 
Arafat, then the chairman of the PLO, conceded to delete the section calling for the 
destruction of Israel from the Palestinian Charter. Subsequently, upon leaving the 
conference room, the Israeli delegation was approached by one of the closest advisers 
to President Clinton, who reportedly shouted at them: “Are you out of your minds!.. 
he is going to be killed because of that! He is too weak for dramatic steps like that - 
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first he needs to be strengthened!”1 Even near his disappearance from the political 
landscape, politically bankrupt and rejected by most of the Palestinian Arabs as 
corrupt and no longer relevant, Arafat needed to be strengthened according to United 
States leadership at the time. 
The Annapolis Conference of 2007 exhibited very similar ill-guided approach 
to negotiations by the Western powers. When a representative of the US agency 
engaged in building up the destroyed Palestinian economy was approached with a 
question of why the US is not making the aid to Palestinian Authority strictly 
contingent on halting the anti-Israeli and anti-American incitements on the official 
television channels and in the education system, he answered with this: “Abu Mazen 
is so weak now, and this is such a not popular step. First of all, it is necessary to 
strengthen him and then afterward it will be possible to demand something of 
him.”2XVIII An argument is begging to be made that the old paradigm of making 
peace with the strongest is not the best policy any more. Perhaps, it needs to be 
reworded into “making peace with the likeminded.” 
Knowing and owning the historical facts about their political and religious 
leaders may help the new generations of Muslim Arabs to examine their own position 
on the international matters and choose a corrected vector on the course to 
reconciliation. The relation of the Islamist anti-Semitism and late Nazi Fascism in the 
                                                
1 Natan Sharansky, "Distorted Reasoning at Annapolis: Why the Conference is 
Doomed to Failure," Jewish World  (2007), 
http://www.aish.com/jewishissues/middleeast/Distorted_Reasoning_at_Annapolis.asp
. 
2 Ibid. 
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Muslim Arab Middle East does not lack documentation - it lacks acknowledgement. 
The Muslim Arab world must become competent in its whole history without 
selective omissions, not to parade it for the sake of shaming the present generation by 
the past of their fathers, but to gain an insight into factors contributing to the conflict 
and prejudice. 
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ENDNOTES: 
                                                
I As one of the most recent examples, Princeton professor emeritus Richard Falk was 
scheduled to take up post for the UN Human Rights Council in the 2008. Previously, 
Mr. Falk publicly accused Israel of Nazi-like atrocities and racism, insisting that they 
are fully comparable to the genocide crisis in Darfur, Sudan. 
 
II Eretz Israel is translated as “the Land of Israel”. Since using one of the names of the 
land exclusively throughout the article might have been found biased toward one of 
the sides of the political conflict involving the land, I used the name appropriated to 
the geography by the historical period in context. (Canaan, Levant, Filastin, 
Philistines, Transjordan, British Palestine, Palestine, Eretz Israel, Israel are some of 
the names rotated through the recent history) 
 
III Hence there were the Junds of Damascus, Urdunn and Filastin stretching from 
North to South of Levant. 
 
IV “Islamism” as a term first is believed to have appeared in French in the mid-
eighteenth century. Oxford English Dictionary lists the term Islamism as early as 
1747. At first synonymous with Islam itself as a religious movement, later it gained 
an association with a political ideology. Presently, it often represents expressions 
suggesting that Islam fundamentally is not only a religion, but also a political system. 
{Martin Kramer, "Coming to Terms: Fundamentalists or Islamists?," Middle East 
Quarterly  (2003).} 
 
V The personal diary of the Field Marshall Ironside was published by his son after his 
death. See also Ghani, Iran and the Rise of Reza Shah: From Qajar Collapse to 
Pahlavi Power, 107-16. 
 
VI One rial equaled 3.077 cents of a US dollar during the times estimated 
 
VII The swastika or its various incarnations could be found throughout Mesopotamia 
and Asia on prehistoric painted pottery and artisans’ crafts. It completed the array of 
other geometric motifs in the ancient Mesopotamian art. The ornamental signs closely 
resembling Nazi swastika were found on some ancient structures including the 
limestone slab of the Neo-Assyrian Temple facade in Ashur, as one example. {Piotr 
Bienkowski and Alan Millard, Dictionary of the Ancient Near East (Philadelphia, PA: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2000), 282.} Swastika is believed to have come 
from the ancient Sumerian civilization and lost its significance by the end of 
Mesopotamian period. It is plausible that it was further forgotten with the Islamic 
conquest and diminishing of Paganism. 
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VIII Copies of official correspondence on the subject written between April 1942 and 
November 1943 are cited by Joan Peters in “From Time Immemorial”. She has served 
as White House consultant on the Middle East during the Carter administration. 
 
IX Also see Gen. Henry Fernand Dentz, a Vichy French General during the WWII 
sentenced to death in 1945 for aiding the Axis powers. {Baram, The Department of 
State in the Middle East 1919-1945, 101.} 
 
X A customary term among the Muslim Arabs to describe the tumultuous year of 
1948 for the Muslim Arabs of British mandated Palestine; some academics and 
historians also use the term al-nakba. The use of the term in the academic literature 
can be quite ambiguous as to the implied fault or responsibility for the disaster that it 
refers to such as in this example: “... the ultimate cause of the Palestinian tragedy was 
a process that began with the Balfour promise to the Zionists in 1917 and ended in the 
nakba of 1948. British and, eventually Zionist and Hashemite policies, actions, and 
forces overwhelmed a weak society with a traditional and ineffective leadership and 
organization.” {Mattar, "The Mufti of Jerusalem and the Politics of Palestine, 1917-
48: An Overview," 131.} 
 
XI Antun Sa’ada was the founder of the Syrian Popular Party or the Syrian National 
Socialist Party (later renamed Social Nationalist Party), which had a powerful 
influence on the Arab youth of Syria and Lebanon during the 1930s. {Lewis, Semites 
and anti-Semites, 148.} 
 
XII Originally accusing Jews and Communists in concocting massive deceits, Hitler 
himself engaged in the described practice quite extensively in his pacts and promises 
to the German citizens and world community [R.E. Murphy et al., National Socialism 
(US Government Printing Office, 1943), pp. 232- 43] 
 
XIII Nonie Darwish was born in Cairo and spent some of her childhood in Gaza. In 
1955, her Egyptian-born father, head of intelligence operations in Gaza, was entrusted 
by Gamal Abdel Nasser to launch covert and overt attacks by Palestinian fedayeen 
“to cause as much death and destruction as possible” against the Jews. An eight year-
old girl, she herself was encouraged to avenge her father’s death by killing Jews, 
which she declined and renounced. In her book Now They Call Me Infidel, Nonie 
Darwish decisively speaks against contemporary xenophobia and anti-Semitism 
among the Muslim Arabs. She writes: “Scapegoating… serves Muslim egos and 
governments. Instead of taking responsibility for [its] problems, Arab culture lays the 
blame on someone else. As an Arab, I often feel deep sadness and shame over what 
my people have done and are still doing to Israel… Our cousins needed protection 
after World War II.” {Nonie Darwish, Now They Call Me Infidel: Why I Renouced 
Jihad for America, Israel and the War on Terror (USA: Penguin Group, 2006).} 
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XIV Additional audio and visual materials including films, cartoons, posters and 
advertisements cited for this work have been observed and attached in the appendix to 
this paper 
 
XV $10 is not a bargain by the local economic standards. Average annual income per 
person in 2006 in West Bank and Gaza, for example, was recorded to be $1,120 in 
CIA World Factbook {USAID, "West Bank and Gaza: Country Profile."} 
 
XVI As of 2007, Dr. Ahmed is a member of the “Incident Management Team” for the 
Department of Homeland Security and a trustee of the World Faiths Development 
Dialogue, set up by the Archbishop of Canterbury and the president of the World 
Bank. He is a trustee on the Board of the Council for a Parliament of the World’s 
Religions and a Distinguished Senior Fellow of the Hasan Family Foundation. Dr. 
Ahmed received the 2004 Professor of the Year Award in Washington DC by the 
Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching and the Council for 
Advancement and Support of Education, the first Gandhi Center Fellowship of Peace 
Award, the First Annual Bridge Builder’s Award from the Interfaith Conference of 
Metropolitan Washington, and the Humanitarian Award by the Chapel of Four 
Chaplains. He and Dr. Pearl were finalists in the “Most Inspiring Person of the Year 
2005” poll conducted by BeliefNet. In 2006, Dr. Pearl and Dr. Ahmed were awarded 
the first ever “Purpose Prize” honoring people over 60 who have taken on society’s 
biggest challenges. 
 
XVII “Palestine: Peace Not Apartheid”, a book by Jimmy Carter published in 2006 by 
Simon and Schuster, was received by many as the desktop reference for the answers 
to the roots and causes of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Criticized as historically and 
factually incorrect, the book was embraced by many intellectuals as a testament 
coming from one of the highest authorities in the realm of the Middle Eastern politics.   
 
XVIII The first person experience was shared by Natan Sharansky, the head of the 
Adelson Institute for Strategic Studies at the Shalem Center. 
 
